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The objective of this paper is twofold. On one hand, we undertake an 
analysis of the recent evolution of capital markets and their effect on the 
availability of external financing in Mexico in the last two decades. On the 
other hand, based on a newly assembled firm-level data set on corporate 
governance and firm performance, we show that better firm-level 
corporate governance practices are linked to higher valuations, better 
performance and more dividends disbursed to investors. These results hold 
after controlling for endogeneity. Overall, the evidence shows that the 
Mexican legal environment poses serious problems for access to capital.   4 
1. Introduction 
Throughout the world the role of the state is being redefined to accommodate the needs 
of a market economy.  Institution-building is becoming widely accepted as the principal 
means of fulfilling this role.  As in other emerging markets, the policy process in Mexico 
has gone beyond macroeconomic stability, and in the next decade that process will be 
critically focused on institution-building.  This includes development of financial 
institutions such as banks and stock exchanges, development of the legal infrastructure 
supporting business, and creation of regulatory mechanisms compatible with best world 
practice.  
  There is now a long cross-country literature (i.e., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 
2001, 2002, 2005, 2006) that shows the importance of investor protection for the 
development of capital markets as it allows firms to gain access to the external funding 
needed to undertake investments at lower costs. The legal approach based on the agency 
model goes beyond the simple Modigliani-Miller framework, where the size of capital 
markets is determined only by the cash flows that accrue to investors.  The separation 
between ownership and control can have a large effect on the access to finance as one 
recognizes that securities are more than the cash flows they represent. This approach 
recognizes that securities entitle investors to exercise certain rights. Therefore, this 
approach can explain why some countries have much larger capital markets than others, 
as legal protections for investor differs enormously from country to country.   
  Mexico is no exception to the rule. The first goal of this paper is to look at the 
evolution of Mexico’s capital markets and shareholder protections in the last 25 years.  
The paper provides a comparison of the status of investors in Mexico and the rest of the 
world, and traces the main evolutions that have occurred in terms of corporate 
governance.  The establishment of self-sustaining capital markets has gained particular 
importance among some sectors in Mexico as the rate of integration into the global 
economy has speeded up. Without self-sustaining capital markets, local firms will find it 
hard to survive in the long run, because they will not be able to secure the funding needed 
to reach the appropriate scale for international competition.  As the paper shows, the last 
10 years have brought about a series of reforms to improve corporate governance, but 
there is still more ground to cover to reach the upward-moving level of shareholder 
protections brought about by corporate governance scandals all over the world.  This   5 
section of the paper also ends with some suggestions for reforms to develop and 
strengthen Mexico’s stock markets.  
  In an environment of intense competition brought by NAFTA and the absence of 
wholesale legal reforms, some Mexican firms have started to offer better protections on 
their own to try to bring in external capital at better terms.  For this reason, the second 
goal of this paper is to provide the first set of empirical results on corporate governance at 
the firm level in Mexico.  The econometric estimates show that better firm-level 
corporate governance practices are linked to higher valuations, better performance and 
greater dividends disbursed to investors.  This approach follows the recent evidence by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Klapper and Love (2002) and Black and Jang (2005) 
that have provided similar results for other countries. 
  The evidence gathered in this paper shows that the legal environment faced by 
corporations in Mexico poses serious problems for their access to capital, but that those 
firms that have started to use the available differentiating tools are rewarded by the 
market with lower costs of capital as they provide better returns to their investors.   
Overall, the country and firm-level evidence for Mexico is supportive of the growing 
literature arguing that it is only through the development of efficient institutions and 
security of investors that firms can secure the basis for sustainable long-run access to 
finance. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  After this introduction, Sections 2 and 3 
analyze the development of Mexico’s capital markets and investor protections in the last 
25 years.  With the use of comparative statistics from other papers (La Porta et al. 1997, 
1998, 2005 and 2006) we are able to follow the development of corporate governance in 
recent times and assess the relatively low shareholder protection environment that has 
characterized most of this period.  The result of a long history of poor investor protection 
has left Mexico with some of the smallest and least developed stock markets in the world. 
This is also matched with high levels of ownership concentration and recent efforts by 
large firm effort to “migrate” or issue securities abroad in order to raise capital.   
  Section 4 presents the set of new data and results that constitutes the core of the 
paper and complements the previous market-wide analysis.  This section analyzes the 
firm-level data specifically gathered for this study.  In 2000, the Mexican private sector 
and market authorities created the first “Code of Corporate Governance” in Latin   6 
America.  This code compelled all publicly traded firms to include a list of corporate 
governance practices at the end of their annual reports.  We have collected this data and 
matched it with firm-level characteristics to analyze the link between corporate 
governance practices, valuations and performance.  The results show that better corporate 
governance leads to improved valuations, better operational performance, and higher 
levels of dividend payout ratios.  As in other existing papers with firm-level data on 
governance, endogeneity is a potential concern.  We undertake several steps to address 
this problem, and our results persist.  
  Finally, the last section of the paper concludes with some ideas on how to 
capitalize on the new laws approved in December 2005 for publicly listed firms, and how 
to push forward the development of Mexico’s local markets with a combination of 
market mechanisms that align incentives, as well as corporate law and judicial reforms.  
  
2.   Investor Protection in the Last 20 years 
Shareholder Protection in the Law 
 
La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997 and 1998) assembled a data set 
covering legal rules pertaining to the rights of investors, and to the quality of enforcement 
of these rules, for forty-nine countries with publicly-traded companies.  Laws tend not to 
be written from scratch, but rather to be transplanted—intentionally or coincidentally—
from a few legal families or traditions. In general, commercial laws come from two broad 
traditions: common law and civil law. Most English-speaking countries belong to the 
common-law tradition based on the British Company Act. The rest of the world belongs 
to the civil-law tradition, derivative of Roman law.  Although there are numerous 
differences among company laws in different countries, we focus on those basic rules that 
scholars believe to be essential to corporate governance.  
  Shareholders have residual rights to the cash flows of the firm, and the right to 
vote is the shareholders’ main source of power. This right to vote in the general meeting 
to elect directors and make major corporate decisions guarantees shareholders that 
management will channel the firm’s cash flows to shareholders through the payment of 
dividends rather than divert the funds to pay themselves higher compensation, undertake 
poor acquisitions or take other measures not in the interest of shareholders.   7 
Therefore, voting rights and the rights that support voting mechanisms are the 
defining features of equity.  Appendix A provides a detailed description of all the 
variables used in this paper, and Table 2.1 presents the evidence on shareholder rights for 
the cross-section of 49 countries included in the original La Porta et al. (1998) paper. The 
table only includes a few countries that are useful comparison as well as the means for 
the common law and civil law families.  
  A useful way to begin the discussion of shareholder rights is to assume the role of 
an investor in a U.S. firm and then become an investor in a Mexican corporation. The six 
columns of Panel A of Table 2.1 provide different measures of how strongly the law 
governing corporations protects minority shareholders against oppression by managers or 
dominant shareholders.  These rights are thus labeled as “anti-director” rights. The first 
four anti-director rights measure how easy it is for an investor to exercise any voting 
rights that she may have. Shareholders in the United States will receive proxy statements 
two weeks in advance of the shareholders’ meeting with detailed information on the 
items to be discussed at the meeting.  They do not need to appear in person at the 
meeting; they can mail their proxy vote instead. The shares of investors who have 
indicated that they will participate in the shareholders’ meeting will not be blocked in the 
days prior to the meeting, because the freedom to trade shares before shareholders’ 
meetings is an important right for those who may want to form alliances to challenge 
management proposals. Directors are not necessarily chosen one at a time through a 
majority vote, and thus shareholders are entitled to have proportional representation or 
cumulative voting for directors.  Our hypothetical investor has the right to call an 
extraordinary shareholders meeting (ESM) to consider a resolution if he owns 10 percent 
of the share capital.  
  The next right listed in Table 2.1 measures the protection of minority shareholders 
against a particular type of expropriation: issuing shares at favorable prices to, for 
example, associates of the controlling shareholders. Out of the six rights in this table, this 
is the only one that shareholders in U.S. corporations do not have.  The law does not 
guarantee shareholders a preemptive right to buy new issues of stock in their holdings.  
Finally, U.S. investors who feel they have been hurt by the decisions of the majority can 
seek redress through the courts. When the court believes that oppression has indeed taken 
place, it may order that the oppressed members’ shares be bought out at a fair price or   8 
that the firm remedy the matters at issue. More generally, best-practice countries such as 
the United States provide legal mechanisms for the protection of oppressed minorities. To 
give just another example, a dissenting investor in Chile has the right to request—at the 
meeting—that the firm buy back his shares at the market price prevailing before the 
meeting.  
  In Mexico, as in the United States, not all shares are endowed with the same right 
to vote. However, unlike in the United States, investors in Mexico are not usually sent 
detailed information about the agenda when they are notified of forthcoming 
shareholders’ meetings. Only by going to the meeting will they know what is discussed. 
In fact, attending the meeting—or designating someone to do so in their place—is the 
only way in which they can vote; proxy by mail is not allowed. Furthermore, announcing 
that they intend to vote their shares will cause them to be blocked, making it impossible 
for them to trade the shares in the days surrounding the meeting. At the meeting, 
shareholders vote on the slate of directors proposed by management and are not allowed 
proportional representation on the board. Investors in Mexican firms must have at least 
33 percent of share capital to have a resolution considered by the ESM. Fortunately, 
investors in Mexico do have a preemptive right that prevents dilution. Regrettably, this is 
the only right (of those that we collect) that shareholders in Mexico have, because they do 
not have any legal recourse against the decisions of the majority. To summarize, Table 
2.1 paints a very bleak picture of shareholder rights in Mexico.  
  A convenient way of summarizing shareholder rights is to aggregate anti-director 
rights into an index, adding 1 if the corporation law protects minority shareholders and 
zero otherwise. For the case of the percentage of share capital needed to call an ESM, we 
give a 1 to those countries where this percentage is at or below the world median of 10 
percent. When we add up these six anti-director rights scores, the United States and 
Canada have a score of 5, while Mexico’s score is only 1. 
  A corroboration of the findings in this table can be exemplified by the opinions of 
various institutions that advise institutional investors around the world. As Table 2.2 
illustrates, associations such as the Investor Responsibility Research Center and 
Institutional Shareholders Services argue that the corporate practices of Mexican firms 
are not best-practice (see Table 2.2 for some examples.)     9 
  A new calculation of shareholder rights undertaken by La Porta, López-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2006) shows that, keeping constant the definitions used for the 1995 data, 
Mexico has not improved in its measure on the Anti-directors index, staying constant at 
an aggregate score of 1.  Nonetheless, the revised set of measures with tighter definitions 
are more closely linked to firms trading in stock markets show that Mexico would have 
moved up to a score of 3.  These data are shown in Panel B of Table 2.1.   
  If we consider market regulation and corporate law with respect to the ability to 
call a meeting, for example, 33 percent of capital is required for non-publicly traded 
corporations, but only 10 percent for publicly traded firms.  This improvement is 
consistent with the fact that it is in the area of securities laws that the progress in 
corporate governance has taken place in Mexico in recent years.   
  The discrepancy shown above between corporate law and securities laws portrays 
the image of the difficulties involved in reforming corporate governance.  The 
government has more direct ways to reinforce or modify securities laws, while reforming 
the Commercial Code involves intense interactions with Congress, which prove to be 
difficult.  One may think that by reforming securities laws we can bypass this road block, 
but in fact, for most relevant circumstances where investor protections are key, the 
regime that is put in place draws from both corporate and securities laws, as well as from 
a series of other regulations that even include civil procedure (i.e., rules of evidence, 
etc.).   
  Based on the recent evidence from Djankov et al. (2005) one can try to see where 
Mexico lies if we were to concentrate on the regulation of a classic self-dealing 
transaction where various sets of laws and regulation interact to create a framework of 
protection of investors against expropriation by a controlling set of shareholders. As 
evidenced in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, up until the end of 2005, Mexico does not score well on 
these measures.  In fact, Mexico’s shareholder protection is still among the lowest in the 
world. 
Enforcement of Laws 
Legal rules are only one element of investor protection; the enforcement of these rules 
may be equally or even more important. If good laws are not enforced, they cannot be 
effective. Likewise, investors may enjoy high levels of protection despite bad laws if an   10 
efficient judiciary system can redress expropriations by management. In this way, strong 
legal enforcement may serve as a substitute for weak rules.  
  Table 2.4 presents several categories for the quality of enforcement of laws in 
different countries. These measures are collected by private credit-risk agencies for the 
use of foreign investors interested in doing business in the respective countries. (The 
agencies include Business International Corporation and Political Risk Services). Table 
2.4 shows three measures: efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, and corruption. 
The first two of these proxies pertain to law enforcement, while the last one captures the 
government’s general attitude toward business. In addition to these measures, the table 
also shows data on the quality of accounting standards of publicly traded firms in 
different countries. Accounting is central to corporate governance, as it may be difficult 
to assess management performance without reliable accounting standards. More broadly, 
cash flows may be very difficult to verify in countries with poor accounting standards; 
consequently, the menu of financial contracts available to investors may be substantially 
narrower in such countries. The index of accounting standards in Table 2.4 is provided by 
the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research based on examination of 
company reports of firms in each country. It is available for 41 of the 49 countries in the 
sample.  
  Compared with the English-origin average, as well as with Canada and the United 
States, Mexico has very weak legal institutions and accounting standards.  Mexico’s 
scores for all enforcement variables are below the world’s average. In fact, Mexico ranks 
between thirtieth and fortieth in the world for all of these measures. Mexico shares poor 
enforcement with the rest of the French legal family, which has the lowest quality of legal 
enforcement and accounting standards. Note that rule of law is the only measure where 
differences in means between common law and French legal origin are not statistically 
significant.  Scandinavian countries have the strongest enforcement mechanisms, with 
German civil-law and common-law countries close behind. Common-law countries, 
although behind Scandinavian nations, are still ahead of the French civil-law countries.  
  These results do not support the conclusion that the quality of law enforcement 
substitutes or compensates for the quality of laws. An investor in Mexico—and more 
generally in a French civil-law country—is poorly protected by both the laws and the 
system that enforces them. On average, the converse is true for an investor in a common-  11 
law country. Poor enforcement and accounting standards aggravate, rather than cure, the 
difficulties faced by investors in French civil-law countries. The weak scores obtained by 
Mexico in shareholder and creditor rights may actually understate the severity of the 
corporate governance problem in Mexican corporations. 
3.  Consequences of Investor Protection in Mexico 
There are at least two reasons why legal institutions may have no effect on the pattern of 
external financing of firms. First, laws may not be necessary to support external financing 
if, for example, companies keep their promises not because they are forced to but because 
they want to build a good reputation to facilitate their access to capital markets.
1 Their 
reputations unravel if the gains from cheating ever exceed the value of keeping external 
financing open, because investors, once they employ inductive reasoning, would never 
extend financing to such a firm to begin with.  
Second, poor laws and their enforcement may have no real consequences if firms can 
easily opt out of the laws of their legal jurisdictions. Easterbrook and Fischel question 
whether legal rules are binding in most instances, because entrepreneurs can offer better 
investor rights, when it is optimal to do so, through corporate charters that effectively 
serve as contracts between entrepreneurs and investors.
2 In practice, however, opting out 
may be costly both for firms that need to write non-standard contracts and for investors 
who need to study them. In addition, courts may be unwilling or unable to enforce non-
standard contracts, further limiting the scope for opting out.  
  Alternatively, if legal institutions matter, ownership concentration should be 
higher in countries with poor investor protection than in countries with strong protections 
for investors for at least two reasons: First, agency problems may call for large-scale 
shareholders to monitor managers and thus prevent or minimize expropriation. Second, 
minority shareholders may be unwilling to pay high prices for securities in countries with 
weak legal protection. At the same time, entrepreneurs will be more reluctant to offer 
shares at discounted prices, thus resulting in higher ownership concentration as well as 
smaller and narrower markets for external equity.
3 Similarly, bad creditor rights may have 
                                                           
1 Diamond (1989 and 1991); see also Gomes (1996).   
2 Easterbrook and Fischel (1991). 
3 Ownership concentration per se may be efficient, because the existence of large-scale shareholders 
monitoring management reduces the agency problem between management and shareholders; see Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986). But large-scale concentration comes at a cost,   12 
analogous price and quantity effects on debt markets. In other words, if laws do not 
protect the rights of creditors, debt markets may be small because creditors may demand 
high interest rates. Moreover, firms may be reluctant to borrow from arm’s-length 
sources under such conditions. 
  Ultimately, the question of whether legal institutions matter is fundamentally 
empirical: if opting out were cheap and simple, the patterns of ownership and external 
finance of firms would not be affected by differences in legal institutions across 
countries. Accordingly, in this section, we examine two types of evidence regarding the 
influence of legal institutions on external finance: ownership concentration, and the size 
and breadth of capital markets. Table 2.5 summarizes the results. 
 
Ownership Concentration 
The first striking result of Table 2.5 is that, in the world as a whole, dispersed ownership 
is a myth: In a typical top-10 firm in the world, 45 percent of the common shares are held 
by the three largest shareholders.
4 The second result is that those countries with weaker 
investor protections have larger share ownership concentration. In particular, countries of 
the French legal family have an average ownership concentration of 55 percent. 
Statistically this number is significantly higher than the mean for the rest of the world and 
for the mean for each of the other three legal families individually.  
  Like the rest of the French origin countries, Mexico has highly concentrated 
ownership. With the exception of Chile, which has strong shareholder rights, all Latin 
American countries in the sample have higher ownership concentration than the world 
mean. After Greece and Colombia (68 percent), Mexico has the third-largest ownership 
concentration level in the world (67 percent). In sum, these data indicate that Mexico has 
unusually high ownership concentration, possibly as an adaptation to weak legal 
protection. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
because it creates another agency problem: the expropriation of minority shareholders’ stakes by large-
scale shareholders. An additional cost of heavily concentrated ownership is that the core investors are not 
diversified. 
 
4 To measure ownership concentration, a 1998 study assembled data for the 10 largest publicly traded, non-
financial private domestic firms in each of forty-five countries. For each country the study measures 
ownership concentration as the median percentage owned by the three largest shareholders in each of these 
ten firms; see La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Vishny (1998b).    13 
The Size and Breadth of Local Capital Markets 
Several interesting patterns emerge from looking at our categories for external equity 
finance in Table 2.5.
5 First, access to external equity financing is most limited in 
countries such as Mexico and the rest of the French civil-law countries. Specifically, the 
ratio of external capital to GNP is roughly half the world mean and one-third of that in 
the United States. Meanwhile the ratio of domestic firms to total population is between 
10 and 15 times lower than the world mean and the U.S. number. Finally, the ratio of 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) to population is roughly 30 to 50 times lower than the 
equivalent number for the world mean and for the United States. In contrast, all three 
equity measures indicate that, on average, access to external equity is easiest in common-
law countries: The ratio of outsider-held stock market to GNP is 60 percent, vs. 40 
percent for the world mean; the number of listed firms per 1 million people is 35, vs. 21.6 
for the world mean; and the number of IPOs per million people is 2.2, vs. 1.02 for the 
world mean. Finally, equity markets in countries of Scandinavian origin are smaller but 
broader than in countries of German origin. To summarize, external equity markets line 
up rather well with shareholder rights and legal institutions: They are smallest in French 
civil-law countries and largest in common-law countries. 
  Several authors have argued that there is an important movement towards 
“functional convergence” in corporate governance in which firms around the world are 
adopting U.S.-type mechanisms to protect investors. There is certainly a move towards 
issuing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), and these seem to improve access to 
external capital markets. An ADR is equivalent to listing a foreign company’s securities 
                                                           
5 This paper uses the three measures of equity finance developed in La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997). The first measure is the 1994 ratio of external equity finance to GNP in each country. 
To compute a rough proxy of external equity finance, they multiply the total market value of common stock 
of all publicly traded firms by the average fraction of the equity not held by the largest three investors (i.e., 
the complement of the ownership variable just described). They scale the total market value of common 
stock by the fraction of equity held by minority shareholders to avoid overestimating the availability of 
external financing. For example, when 90 percent of a firm’s equity is held by insiders, looking at the 
market capitalization of the whole firm gives a tenfold overestimate of how much it has actually raised 
externally. The procedure followed may still overestimate the level of external financing, because the 
ownership concentration figures are based on the largest firms and because they ignore cross-holdings. 
Still, this procedure is conceptually better than looking at the ratio of market capitalization to GNP. 
The remaining two measures of external equity finance capture market breadth. The first is the 
number of domestic firms listed in the stock exchange of each country relative to its population. The 
second is the number of initial public offerings of shares in each country between mid-1995 and mid-1996, 
also relative to the population. They look at both the stock and flow of new companies obtaining equity 
financing, because the development of financial markets has accelerated greatly in the last decade, and 
hence the IPO data provides a more recent picture of external equity financing.   14 
on an exchange that protects shareholders, mainly through stricter disclosure 
requirements. This, in fact, is done by many companies when they list they shares as 
ADRs in New York. Such a listing in New York (or London), supported in part by the 
threat of delisting, raises the level of shareholder protection.  
  Lins, Strickland, and Zenner
6 show that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
falls when an ADR is issued by a company from a country with a weak legal system and 
a less-developed capital market (as defined by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny
7). Weisbach and Reese
8 show that companies in civil law countries are more 
likely to list ADRs on an organized exchange in the United States, thus committing 
themselves to greater disclosure. In particular, Mexico is the country with the highest 
percentage of locally listed firms that have ADRs in the United States. As Figure 3.7 
shows, close to 38 percent of all Mexican firms listed on the Mexican Stock exchange 
have some listing in United States stock markets. The percentage of firms from Mexico 
that have an ADR is also among the highest, reaching close to 15 percent.  This evidence 
supports the view that in the current environment of weak investor protection, firms try to 
find ways to access external capital markets.  
  A related mechanism of opting into a more protective legal regime is an 
acquisition by a company already operating in such a regime. When a U.S. company 
acquires a Mexican company, the possibilities for legal expropriation of investors 
diminish. In a friendly acquisition, the controlling shareholders of the Mexican company 
can be compensated for the benefits they lose, making it more likely that they will go 
along. Such acquisitions enhance efficiency, because wasteful expropriation is replaced 
by publicly shared profits and dividends. Some of the acquisitions in the NAFTA region 
in the last few years reflect this particular phenomenon.  
 
4. Corporate Governance, Valuation and Investor Returns in Mexico 
 
The Sample  
 
The literature on corporate governance has established that national and state laws and 
regulations affect the valuation of firms (La Porta et al., 2001, and Daines, 2001) and 
dividend payout ratios (La Porta et al., 2000).  In this section, we follow the approach 
                                                           
6 Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2000).  
7 La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
8 Weisbach and Reese (2002).    15 
used in recent papers (i.e., Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2002; 
and Black and Jang, 2005) and analyze whether the variation of firm-level governance 
practices is also associated with firm valuation, performance and dividend payments.  For 
this purpose, we have collected firm-level financial data and a set of indices on corporate 
governance practices for Mexican corporations during the period 2002-2005. 
There were 159 listed companies in the Mexican Stock Exchange in 2002. To 
obtain historical financial data for all these companies, we put together information from 
several data sets. Our main data source is Bloomberg, from where we were able to get the 
main financial and operation data. The coverage from Bloomberg was not enough for the 
goals of the project since it did not have a long history for all firms and it did not cover 
all firms across sizes; we also wanted to include firms that had issued bonds rather than 
shares.  The data also had some missing companies due to suspension, delisting, or lack 
of trading activity.  In order to solve all of these potentially important selection and 
survivorship biases, we complemented the data with historical and financial information 
from the actual annual reports of each company. The annual reports contain general 
information on the firm, financials, administrative standards, shareholders situation, as 
well as information on the market behavior of the equity prices. Using all of these 
sources, we obtained complete financial information for 150 companies listed for the 
fiscal year 2002-2003.  
Table 4.1 provides the main financial characteristics of the firms in our sample.  
The detailed definitions of each variable are provided in Appendix A.2.  In order to avoid 
sometimes large year-to-year variations in profitability and performance ratios, the table 
provides data for the average of the two fiscal years of 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. As the 
table shows, this is a period of relatively positive growth. The average firm shows an 
income to sales ratio of almost 5 percent and average sales growth of almost 3 percent.  
ROA and ROE for the mean firm is 2.3 and 6.3 percent, respectively.  Past profitability 
had also been growing during the 1997-2002 period at a similar 5 percent rate, as 
measured by lagged income to sales.  The average Mexican firm with listed securities had 
a debt to assets ratio of close to 50 percent, which is very standard.   
There are five outcome variables that we use in this paper.  The first are valuation 
measures.  We use the classic valuation measure of Tobin’s Q used by the initial studies 
in governance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988) as well   16 
as in more recent papers (La Porta et al., 2001, and Gompers, Ishi and Metrick, 2003).  
But we also supplement it with the Price to Book multiple for robustness.  As Table 4.1 
shows, valuation multiples for the average company were 0.943 and 0.901, respectively, 
when we calculate Tobin’s Q and Price to book ratios.  The maximum valuation 
measures reached between 2.2 and 2.5 respectively.  As another set of alternative 
outcome measures, we also use return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as 
measures to proxy for operating performance.
9  For our sample, the average ROA is 2.3 
percent, while the mean ROE is three times as large at 6.4 percent.  Finally, firms were 
disbursing positive dividends on average, with a mean dividend payout ratio of 14.4 
percent.   
As the table also shows, 84 percent of the sample had listed stock while the 
remaining companies had only public bond issues.  Close to 60 percent of firms in our 
sample have their headquarters in Mexico City. 
Later in this section, we will analyze the relationship between various corporate 
governance indicators and measures of valuation, performance and dividend payouts.   
But before doing this, let us explain the origin and configuration of the data on corporate 
governance practices put together for this paper. 
 
 Data on Corporate Governance Practices in Mexico 
 
The second database on corporate governance practices was obtained from the annual 
governance reports that each firm has to present to the Mexican Stock Exchange at the 
same time as their annual report. These reports were required by the Committee on Best 
Corporate Practices, which was created by pulling forces from the private (Consejo 
Coordinador Empresarial) and the public sector.  The Committee was formed by a 
multidisciplinary group including academics in the area, controlling shareholders of large 
and small corporations, managers, and representatives of the accounting, finance and 
legal professions.  
In 1999, this Committee published a Code of Best Practices that included a series 
of recommendations on what were regarded as good corporate governance practices at 
the time.  The recommendations fell on the four basic areas: (1) disclosure of information 
                                                           
9 Like other papers (i.e., Klapper and Love, 2002), due to the volatility of returns, particularly in emerging 
markets, we do not use returns as a proxy for performance.   17 
related to the administrative structure, the objectives and functioning of the various Board 
Committees; (2) the existence of adequate channels for timely disclosure and the 
existence of good quality of financial information; (3) the adequacy of communication 
processes between management and board members; and (4) the protection of 
shareholders rights, as well as the appropriate disclosure and communication mechanisms 
with them.  
  Mexico was concerned about corporate governance mainly as a result of the lack 
of growth in its markets and the damaging experience of East Asian countries that were 
emerging from their 1997-1999 crises.  This was the first such effort was undertaken in 
Latin America, and one of the first in the world, as it came before the U.S. corporate 
governance scandals.  At the time, only the United Kingdom and a few other countries 
had implemented such an approach to try to foster more transparency in the market and a 
mechanism that facilitated the transmission of information to investors.    
  The philosophical principle underlying these codes is that the disclosure of 
information about corporate governance practices and investor protections by the firm 
allows the market to perceive the differences among the policies followed by various 
companies. Information should allow shareholders to distinguish those firms that adhere 
to investor protections, in turn making shareholders more willing to give the companies 
funds. In the end, those firms with better practices should find it easier to access capital 
and at lower cost, as they provide a more certain environment for the investor. 
  The adoption of the principles of the Code of Best Practice in Mexico, as in most 
other countries, is voluntary, but the disclosure by each firm in the stock is compulsory. 
Starting with fiscal year 2000, all publicly-traded firms on the Mexican Stock Exchange 
must state in their annual report to the shareholders which rules of the code they follow, 
and which they do not.  They may state why they do not follow the rules they have 
elected not to follow, and describe any alternate mechanisms they may have for the 
protection of investors.   All firms with publicly trading securities, both equity and debt, 
have to disclose the information.   
The list of corporate governance practices that was created at the time consists of 
mandatory answers to 55 questions.  Although firms are not required to meet the 
recommendations of the code, the fact that all firms with publicly traded securities have 
to disclose this has been useful to investors.  We should also mention that, although the   18 
answers are provided by the firms themselves, analyst and market participants can 
request specific information about these issues and constantly monitor the veracity of the 
information. The reputation loss from a deviation from truthful answers could be 
substantial, since the nature of the information requested is verifiable by market 
participants and is published as part of the annual report of the firm, which needs to be 
approved by the board of directors. 
From the corporate governance questionnaire, we construct a firm-level Corporate 
Governance (CG) index by adding one point for every question where the company 
meets the recommendation of the code.  We standardize the index to lie between 0 and 1 
by dividing the number of positive answers by the total number of questions in the 
questionnaire.  Table 4.1 shows the main descriptive statistics of our CG index for the 
150 firms in our sample.  Our CG index is the average of the indices for the two years 
(2003 and 2004) for which we have disaggregated company data.  The mean company in 
Mexico met 78.4 percent of all the recommendations in the code.  The best firm showed a 
98.2 percent rate of compliance, while the worst firm met less than 30 percent of the 
code’s recommendations.  In 2004, close to 90 firms out of the 150 in our sample, met 
more than 80 percent of the code’s recommendations.  Another 35 firms met between 70 
and 80 percent of the code, bringing the cumulative percentage of firms above 70 percent 
compliance to 83 percent of the sample.   
Although we do not have firm-by-firm disaggregated data for previous years, 
Figure 4.3 shows that the number of recommendations met by the average company in 
the market, according to the National Banking and Stock Market Commission.
10 
Compliance has increased over time.  In 2000, the first year of the code, the mean firm 
followed 64 percent of the principles while the following year the number jumped to 70 
percent.  The period 2002-2004 saw smaller increases leaving the total compliance close 
to 77 percent at the end of the period. Compliance increased only one percent from 2003 
to 2004, suggesting a slow-down in change of corporate practices.  The seemingly large 
initial jump from 2000 to 2001 could mean that some firms may have been confused on 
the exact meaning of the questions the first year, or that the code introduced some 
pressure for firms to change quickly.  
                                                           
10 The number of companies used for this statistic is different than the 150 companies in our sample as the 
data of the Commission includes all firms with publicly listed securities each year. There were 159 firms 
with listed securities in 2004, for example.   19 
As Table 4.1 shows, 84 percent of the firms in our sample are equity issuers, 
while the rest have public bonds trading in the Mexican Stock Exchange.  Both kinds of 
firms are required to provide answers to the corporate governance questions in their 
annual report.  In general, equity issuers, who tend to be larger and older firms, met 81 
percent of the recommendations, while firms with publicly traded bonds only met 65 
percent on average in 2004 (see bottom of Table 4.2).   
Figure 4.2 also shows the differences between firms issuing equity and those 
issuing public debt in the market.  Debt issuers have a flatter distribution and a lower 
mean and median.  These tend to be smaller firms which have just now started to access 
the public credit market due to changes in regulation that have produced a very large 
boom, as Section 2 of the paper shows.   In 2004, 56 percent of equity issuers met over 80 
percent of all code recommendations, while this number was only 15 percent for debt 
issuers.  The lower tail of the distribution for debt issuers is also thicker: close to 30 
percent of public bond issuers met less than 60 percent of all recommendations, whereas 
this number reached only 4 percent for issuers of stock.  
The 55 questions of the index are grouped in eight sections from which we have 
created sub-indices that have also been standardized to lie between 0 and 1.  The eight 
sub-indices are: (1) Composition of the Board of Directors; (2) Board functions and the 
general structure of board committees; (3) Board operational rules; (4) Board member’s 
duties; (5) The structure and functions of the Evaluation and Compensation Committee; 
(3) The structure and functions of the Audit Committee; and (7) The structure and 
functions of the Finance and Planning Committee; and (8) Protection of shareholder 
rights and shareholder meetings.  Table 4.1 also shows the percentage of questions in 
each category that are met by the mean company in our sample.  These numbers range 
from 53 percent for the committee of evaluation and compensation to 90.3 percent for the 
questions related to directors’ duties.    
Table 4.2 goes into the finer details of the data we gathered, showing the 
percentage of firms that meet the each specific recommendation for the years 2003 and 
2004 separately. The bottom of the table shows that compliance with the 
recommendations of the code of best practices has increased.  In 2004, corporations with 
publicly traded securities in Mexico met 78.5 percent of all code recommendations, while 
that number was only 78.4 percent a year before.  Table 4.2 lumps equity and debt issuers   20 
together, but the paragraphs below describing the data in the table point out the main 
differences between these groups.  
  An analysis of the specific questions in each of these categories reveals several 
interesting corporate governance patterns of Mexican corporations.  There are three areas 
of the code that deal with the board’s functions, structure and operations. In terms of 
board composition, Mexican firms have substantially reduced the size of their boards in 
the last 10 years. Today, over 91 percent of firms that issue either equity or debt have 
boards between 5 and 15 members.  It is also the case that in 98 percent of the firms that 
issue equity, at least 20 percent of the members of the board are independent.  This 
number is only 40 percent for firms issuing debt, therefore explaining the low overall 
average in the table.  While these are clear advances from what the classic board of a 
Mexican firm looked like 10 years ago, firms are still not clearly communicating 
information about board members to their shareholders.  Only between 50 and 65 percent 
of firms specify in their annual reports the classification of directors as independent, 
owner, and related.  This number reaches 65-70 percent for firms issuing equity and only 
15 to 30 percent for firms issuing debt.  Another area where more progress may be 
needed is with “substitute” board members.  In Mexico, board members have the right to 
nominate a substitute that can go to the meetings and take their place.  Only a quarter of 
firms have adopted a structure without substitute directors.  In fact, on 63 percent of 
occasions only a pre-established substitute can take the place of the actual board member.  
These are not best corporate governance practices, as actual directors could be detached 
from their functions if the substitute is the one doing the work or going to the meetings.   
The second area of the code deals with the functions of the board and the general 
structure of the specialized board committees.  As in the previous area, most boards have 
shrunk the size of the committees, and close to 90 percent of those firms issuing equity, 
but only 55 of those issuing debt, meet the target size of three to seven members 
recommended by the code.  Importantly, over 80 percent of boards have established 
specialized committees to deal with management evaluation and compensation, auditing 
and financial planning.  An independent director is the chair of the audit committee in 90 
percent of equity issuers, but only in 35 percent of occasions in firms with public bonds.  
The operation or internal working of the board is one of the areas where most firms 
follow the suggested principles, with close to 90 percent of all issuers meeting the targets   21 
in terms of number of meetings per year, devoting time to the strategy of the firm, ease of 
calling a meeting, and training of first-time directors.  In the area of access to relevant 
information in a timely fashion, however, the percentage of firms falls to about 80 
percent.      
  The forth area of the index talks about the duties of directors, where close to 90 
percent of the firms meet all principles.  In basically all firms, board members are said to 
report conflicts of interest and abstain from voting, to only use the assets of the firm’s 
business, to keep confidentiality, and to dedicate the appropriate time to their job as board 
members.  The only two questions where the number of firms responding “yes” falls to 
60-70 percent are those that ask about the existence of specific policies for the personal 
use of the firm’s assets and the communication between the board member and her 
substitute.  The picture painted by this sub-index is one of strong boards of directors with 
clearly defined duties that deal with conflicts of interest.  This is probably one of the 
areas that are harder to objectively verify by market participants, and thus we want to 
make sure our results in the econometric work do not depend crucially on these answers. 
  The following three areas of the index deal with the specific functions and inner 
working of specialized committees.  The questions of the compensation and evaluation 
committee show one of the largest deficiencies in Mexican corporate governance 
practices.  More than half of listed companies do not disclose the policies employed in 
this area, and 40 percent of firms declare that they either do not have such a committee 
or, if it exists, it does not deal with the evaluation of compensation packages for high-
level executives.  The numbers for debt issues are only about 10 percent below those of 
equity issuers: this is an area where there is clearly a great deal of room to grow for both 
kinds of firms.   The audit committee, which was the object of substantial changes in 
regulation in the last five years, is an area where most firms meet best corporate 
governance practices, as specified in the code.  The vast majority of Mexican firms have 
an external auditor different from the “comisario,” who is supposed to be an additional 
check in this area, as he is required to report problems to shareholders.  Curiously 
enough, only one in two firms discloses the profile of the comisario in the annual report.  
In over 90 percent of cases, firms limit the income of the external auditor and require 
audit partner rotation every six years.  Most firms have internal audits and control 
systems, but the board has a role in setting up and approving those policies in only 75-80   22 
percent of cases.  The third committee with specific recommendations in the code has the 
functions of looking into the investment policies and planning of the firm. The numbers 
show that close to 30 percent of the firms do not have the board analyze these kinds of 
issues in a systematic manner or through a specific committee.  The numbers are 
remarkably similar for equity and bond holders.  This is one of the functions of the board 
that has least permeated Mexico’s companies.  
  The final area of the code deals with shareholder rights.  As previous work has 
shown, corporations rarely deviate from the package of shareholder rights that is 
mandated by laws and regulations. Therefore, this area of the code is mostly devoted to 
issues involving the flow of information to holders of shares and the way in which 
shareholder meetings are carried out, which allows room for abuse of power.  Mainly as a 
result of regulation, a substantial change has occurred in terms of the way in which firms 
disclose the agenda for the meeting. Today, the old practice of grouping various issues 
under a vague agenda point or including an area for “various issues,” has virtually 
disappeared in stock issuers and reaches 80-90 percent of firms with public bonds. But 
the rest of the numbers in the section show a couple of more deficiencies in this area. 
Only half of the firms include the proposal for the board and a description of the potential 
board members in the information given to shareholders.  Additionally, in only 57 
percent of cases does the information include relevant issues of specialized board 
committees.  Not surprisingly, only two in three firms say that their shareholders have 
enough information and voting alternatives to be able to instruct others to vote on their 
behalf.  The data show that the average Mexican corporation is far from providing 
complete and timely information to shareholders to consider relevant issues and facilitate 
their voting in meetings.    
To end the description of corporate governance practices of Mexican listed firms, 
it is worth mentioning that the practices of bond issuers substantially trail those of equity 
issuers in regard to board composition and structure.  In these two areas, the number of 
bond issuers meeting all recommendations is only half of equity issuers.  There are only 
three areas where the differences between the two groups are negligible: director duties, 
audit committee and finance committee.  In the rest of the categories, there are between 
10 to 15 percent more equity issuers meeting all requirements.   
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Econometric Results 
 
The previous section provided a first look at the main corporate governance and financial 
characteristics of publicly listed corporations in Mexico.  The goal of the rest of the 
section is to examine the relationship between firm-level governance measures, valuation, 
performance and dividend payout ratios.  As discussed in the introduction, it is possible 
that certain types of firms, such as those that need to raise capital in the future, are more 
likely to adopt better corporate governance.  Endogeneity is certainly a concern in other 
papers in the area of firm-level practices (e.g., Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003, and 
Klapper and Love, 2002).  
There are several potential sources of endogeneity in these data.  First and 
foremost, unobserved future growth opportunities could lead controlling shareholders and 
managers to improve their levels of disclosure and minority protections in order to raise 
capital at lower cost.   This means that our valuation measures are also likely to be 
determined by expected future growth prospects.  A second source of endogeneity could 
come from the intrinsic nature of the firm, its assets or cash flows.  Firms with large free 
cash flows (Jensen, 1986) would make investors concerned about potential expropriation 
and may thus adopt better corporate governance measures to allay those concerns. 
Similarly, it may be particularly difficult for investors to monitor firms with lower 
tangible assets; this may consequently require better governance practices (Klapper and 
Love, 2002).  Finally, the size or the age of a firm may also affect corporate practices. 
The operations of a small firm could be easier to understand and monitor, while larger 
firms or firms in multiple industries would have potentially larger agency problems and 
would thus try to adopt better corporate governance.   
In this paper, we will follow the approach used in similar papers to try to 
disentangle the corporate governance effect on performance and valuation measures by 
controlling for various company characteristics likely to be associated with higher growth 
prospects, higher needs of monitoring due to the nature of the firm’s assets and cash 
flows, and firm size.  At the end of the section, we also use instrumental variables 
methods to provide a further robustness check to our initial results.      
As a result of endogeneity concerns, it is important to establish the association 
between our measures of governance and firms’ characteristics.  In Table 4.3, we analyze 
these relationships to establish patterns that help us identify important company traits that   24 
we should take into account in the following econometric work.  Table 4.3 shows pair-
wise correlations between our aggregate Corporate Governance (CG) index, valuation 
and performance measures, and company characteristics for the cross-section of 150 
firms in our sample.  
There are four sets of results that emerge from this table. First, the first column of 
correlations between the CG index and the rest of the variable shows that firms with 
better corporate governance have higher valuations, as measured by Tobin’s Q and 
Price/Book value, but not higher performance in the form of ROA and ROE.  Firms with 
better corporate governance practices tend to be larger in terms of sales, domiciled in 
Mexico City, and/or firms that have issued equity locally and abroad in the form of 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs).  These results are consistent with the view that 
those firms that have entered the U.S. market have higher levels of corporate governance, 
probably resulting from the fact that they have to meet higher international requirements.  
We should also be aware that the opposite may be taking place; in other words, it is those 
firms that had better governance to begin with that were able to raise capital 
internationally.  Importantly, current growth rates and lagged profitability are not 
significantly correlated to our CG index, and lagged profitability has in fact a negative 
correlation with our index.  This should help alleviate some concerns about the main 
source of potential endogeneity here.  In terms of cash flow or asset characteristics that 
may explain higher corporate governance, we do not observe a clear pattern of 
association of our CG index with industries that could be a priori regarded as having 
higher free cash flows or intangible assets (results not included in the table).   
Overall, the data contained in the first column of the table do not show signs of 
serious endogeneity problems, with the exception of firm size, but in order to disentangle 
the true effect of corporate governance on valuation, performance and dividend 
payments, we will control for several company characteristics in the regressions that 
follow. 
The second set of results in Table 4.3 addresses the relationship between the 
dependent variables in the regression work below.  The two valuation measures and the 
two profitability measures have a correlation of 0.86 with each other.  The correlations 
between valuation and profitability measures are also very high, ranging from 0.36 to 
0.45, and all statistically significant at one percent.  The table also indicates that the most   25 
valuable and profitable firms have the highest dividend payouts.  Overall, these series of 
correlations show that all of our future dependent variables move together very strongly. 
In terms of other predictors of other variables correlated with our outcome 
measures, we can observe three basic patterns.  First, larger firms and those with higher 
current and past sales growth have higher Tobin’s Qs and Price/Book ratios, as well as 
higher measures of performance. But it is only the firms with larger sales and those with 
the highest past growth that pay more dividends now.  There is really no clear 
relationship among measures of indebtedness, valuation, performance or dividend payout. 
Finally, there is some evidence that firms located in Mexico City have higher valuation 
multiples, but not those that have issued an ADR.  Neither of these two types of firms has 
higher profitability, as proxied by ROA and ROE.  The only other thing worth 
mentioning in the table is the fact that firms that only have public debt are more 
profitable, i.e., they show higher ROE and income to sales ratios, than those that have 
only a local equity listing. 
Making use of the patterns shown in Table 4.3, the econometric work in the 
following tables controls for various company characteristics that could be determinants 
of valuation and performance.  Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show the results of regressing each 
of our five dependent variables of interest on the Corporate Governance index and other 
company and industry controls.  All regressions control for key company characteristics 
that the theory predicts should have an impact on valuation or performance measures.  In 
each regression we include a measure of indebtedness, a size control, a measure of 
profitability (except where the dependent variable is performance) and a measure of 
growth, either current or lagged.
11     
We also take into account room for potential endogeneity problems emerging 
from the nature of the firm’s assets or cash flows according to differences across 
industries.  Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 5.6 present the results of industry-level fixed effects 
regressions. In order to try to proxy for the differences in assets and cash flows, we use a 
fairly detailed industry breakdown. The industry classifications in our sample is the 
Bloomberg industry group-level classification, which is similar to a 2-digit SIC coding.  
Finally, all regressions present robust standard errors.   
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The regressions shown in these tables use the average of the two years for which 
we have data (2002-2003 and 2003-2004).  Therefore, there is one observation per firm in 
the regressions. This approach has several advantages, as it eliminates the high volatility 
of yearly financials and helps avoid problems with standard errors.  But it also has the 
disadvantage of not exploiting panel data. We have also run alternative econometric 
specifications for each year separately, and for a panel regression with two-year 
observations per firm, adding year dummies in the specification.  The results do not 
significantly change, so we only present the average regressions in the paper for space 
reasons.
12   
Table 4.4 presents valuation results. Panel A uses Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable, while Price/Book value is the outcome variable in Panel B.  As Table 4.3 shows, 
these two measures are highly correlated, but we still use both to provide a robustness 
check of the results. There are some results worth mentioning.  First, the only company 
characteristic that is related to valuation is size.  Bigger firms tend to have higher 
valuation multiples, but significance at 10 percent is only reached in two out of the six 
specifications in each case.  According to the theory, sales growth is positively associated 
with higher valuation, but not at a statistically significant level. Neither of the two 
measures of indebtedness is statistically related to Tobin’s Q or Price/Book ratios in our 
sample. 
The aggregate index of Corporate Governance appears as positive and significant 
in all Tobin’s Q regressions and in half of those with Price/Book ratios.  The economic 
impact of the index is large:  a two-standard deviation increase in the CG index, increases 
Tobin’s Q between 0.17 and 0.23, or between 18 and 25 percent above the mean Tobin’s 
Q of 0.94 for the sample. The same two-standard deviation jump increases Price/Book 
multiples between 0.21 and 0.26, or 23 and 26 percent above the mean 0.90 Price/book 
ratio.   
The results on the impact of corporate governance practices on valuation are large 
and significant.  They support previous results in Klapper and Love (2002) and Black and 
Jang (2003), as well as other recent papers relating to this subject. We would in fact 
expect that valuation measures would be the prime variable capturing the effect of 
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also.  We are currently working on collecting the data of the Corporate Governance index for the previous 
three years of information and plan to expand the specifications into a panel across the five years of data.   27 
improved corporate governance. According to the model in La Porta et al. (2001), 
improved valuations as a result of better corporate governance results from the fact that 
investors’ higher confidence that controlling shareholders will not expropriate the cash 
flows of the firm.  Investors are thus more willing to provide capital to firms at lower 
cost, which is reflected in higher valuation multiples for those firms with better 
governance practices.  
Table 4.5 has the same format of the previous table but the dependent variables 
here are ROA and ROE as proxies for operating performance.  As in the previous table, 
larger firms in terms of sales have higher performance, and in two of the four 
specifications in each panel this relationship is statistically significant.  In the case of 
ROA, both financial leverage and debt over assets ratios come in negative, but again, this 
is only significant for two of the four regressions.  Current sales growth and lagged 
profitability do come in positive and strongly associated with higher performance in both 
panels. 
As noted above, we would expect the first order impact of corporate governance 
to be captured by the valuation measures used in Table 4.4. Nonetheless, an argument can 
be made that better-governed firms are better run, probably due to the existence of better 
mechanisms to face changing conditions or new opportunities.  These firms would then 
be thought of as being able to provide a higher return per dollar.  The logic behind a 
positive association between performance and governance has to rely on some form of 
market inefficiency, as investors underestimate the higher agency costs associated with 
poor governance practices. Some recent papers have tested this hypothesis for other 
countries and have found a positive effect of governance on operating performance (see 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003, Klapper and Love, 2002, and other recent papers on 
this topic).  An additional incentive for us to add this analysis is because operating 
performance measures allows us to include in our analysis all firms that have publicly 
traded bonds trading on the market.
13  The results on the association between our CG 
index and ROA are positive and significant in all four regressions, while for ROE they 
only reach significance in one specification.  For the case of ROA, the economic 
significance is also large: a between 29 and 40 percent above the mean ROA of 2.53 for 
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the running sample. For the case of ROE, the impact of a similar two-standard deviation 
jump in governance is only between 7 and 15 percent above the mean. 
Finally, Table 4.6 performs the same kind of analysis as in the previous two tables 
but for dividend payout ratios.  Following the “outcome” agency model of dividend 
payments specified in La Porta et al. (2002), firms with stronger governance practices 
should be associated with higher dividend payouts.  The results of the Tobit regressions 
in the table support this view: stronger firm-level governance practices are associated 
with higher dividend payouts, which are statistically significant in two of the six 
specifications.  To provide a magnitude of the effect, a two-standard deviation increase in 
the CG index is reflected in an increased dividend payout ratio between 0.37 and 1.44 
percentage points, equivalent to a 2.5 to 9.6 percent increase in the mean ratio. 
Overall, the results in Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 show a positive and significant 
impact of firm-level corporate governance measures on valuation, operating performance 
and dividend payouts.  In line with previous evidence for other countries, these results 
support the view that firms that provide a better package of governance measures are 
more highly valued by markets and distribute more profits to their shareholders. 
   
Robustness Checks 
 
Although the regressions in the previous tables control for several variables that capture 
other firm characteristics that could be associated with higher valuations as well as with 
better corporate governance, one may still be concerned about endogeneity.  As seen in 
most papers in the firm-level governance literature, it is hard to find a perfect set of 
instruments. Table 4.7 represents our attempt to deal with this issue through instrumental 
variables.  The table uses three instruments that could arguably, though not perfectly, be 
said to have some exogenous variation on governance practices.  The first instrument is a 
dummy for the location of the firm’s headquarters.  The distribution of headquarters in 
Mexico has certainly been impacted by the search for political connections, but since 
NAFTA—and even before—several firms and industrial sectors have chosen to locate 
themselves outside of Mexico City in either the north or in other regional capitals for 
other reasons.  About 60 percent of the firms in our sample are headquartered in Mexico 
City.  The second instrument is a size dummy for the biggest decile of firms.  We have 
argued in the previous section that size is a potential determinant of corporate   29 
governance, if for example bigger firms are harder to monitor or their higher visibility as 
the top corporations makes them more prone to adopt better governance practices.  Our 
third and final instrument is a dummy equal to 1 for those firms that have equity issues 
and 0 for those that have public bonds in the market. There are close to 16 percent of 
firms in our sample that are bond issuers alone.  These firms are typically new entrants 
into the markets arena and have been subjected to a very different world of scrutiny and 
market pressures than long-time stock issuers.  We can only use this instrument in the 
subset of regressions of operating performance and dividend payments.  Although there 
are some plausible arguments for the use of these instruments, they are admittedly 
imperfect.  Statistically, as shown in Table 4.3, the correlation between these measures 
and our corporate governance index is high and significant.  Meanwhile, they show a 
mixed correlation pattern with valuation, operating performance and dividend payout 
measures. 
  The results of this table, although weaker than the tables before, also show a 
positive pattern of association between our CG index and all outcome measures.  In close 
to half of the specifications statistical significance is reached.  The magnitude of the 
coefficients and their economic impact more than double for all measures.   
The results on the previous sections are encouraging for firms trying to improve their 
access to capital at lower cost.  The evidence is much more on the side of positive effects 
than on lack of impact.  The next section breaks down the CG index into its components 
to determine whether it is worthwhile to concentrate on improving certain measures.  
 
Impact of Different Areas of Firm-Level Governance 
 
Given the positive effects of firm-level corporate governance variables, corporations that 
want to benefit may want to know if there are any specific areas where they should be 
concentrating their efforts.  This may be particularly important if one believes that there 
is limited room on what a firm can do to change structures that are likely to be sustained 
by a large tradition of strong insiders with large discretionary powers. 
Table 4.8 takes a look at the correlations between our CG index, its components 
and our outcome measures.  To the initial eight components of the index, we have added 
an area called “Board of Directors,” which groups the first three areas of the index that 
have to do with the Board.  The first thing to notice from Table 4.8 is that all sub-indices   30 
are highly and statistically significantly correlated with each other.  The only exception is 
the relationship between director duties, board composition, and the committee of 
evaluation and compensation. But by and large, the data suggest that firms that tend to do 
well in one category also do well in the rest of the categories or sub-indices.  The second 
thing worth mentioning is that, although the first column shows that there is a significant 
positive correlation between the aggregate index of governance and valuation measures, 
this is not the case for most of the sub-indices on their own. Only the sub-indices of the 
Audit Committee and the Finance and Planning Committee have an independent positive 
correlation with valuation measures. In the case of measures of performance and 
dividends, neither the aggregate nor the independent components manage to have a 
significant positive correlation. 
Table 4.9 takes a closer look at the same question in a multivariate setting. The 
table presents the same kind of regressions as the ones run in tables before, but we only 
show one of the specifications of controls across our five outcome measures.
14 Although 
all subindices have a positive impact on valuation and performance, only a few of them 
are statistically significant on their own.  Moreover, there is no clear pattern on what 
works best.  In terms of valuation, it seems that the impact of the audit committee and the 
finance committee are the most significant, along with directors’ duties.  Meanwhile, the 
Board of Directors indices work best for operating performance and dividends in general. 
 
5.  Reforms for Deepening Mexico’s Financial Markets 
 
The previous sections have two broad implications.  First, they show that the most 
developed financial markets are protected by regulations and laws. However, they do not 
tell us what the best form of regulation is, which may well include self-regulation as well 
as government regulation. Still, totally unregulated financial markets do not work well, 
presumably because they allow corporate insiders to expropriate too much from outside 
investors. One dramatic illustration of this phenomenon is the evidence presented on 
cross-listing for Mexican firms in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.  In fact, the most sought-after 
place for listing by Mexican publicly held companies happens to be New York—a 
heavily regulated exchange when it comes to disclosure and protection of minority 
shareholders—rather than Mexico City.  
                                                           
14 Similar results are obtained for the other specifications.     31 
  Second, better firm-level corporate governance practices within Mexico have real 
benefits in terms of valuation, performance and higher disbursement of profits.  The 
analysis in the previous pages suggests that the objective of both kinds of measures 
should be to protect outside investor rights. As the empirical research shows, the benefits 
of such changes would be to expand a country’s financial markets, to facilitate external 
financing of new firms, to move away from concentrated ownership, and to improve the 
efficiency of investment allocation.  
  What can be done to achieve this goal, and what are the obstacles?  This analysis 
raises a number of questions for firm-level and countrywide legal reforms.  How can a 
policymaker try to improve markets? What can a firm do in a poor legal environment?  
We address these questions in the concluding section. 
  The improvement of investor protection would require rather radical changes in 
the legal system and/or unilateral internal company-level governance changes.  Securities 
and Company laws will need to be amended, and the regulatory and judicial mechanisms 
of enforcing investor rights need to be radically improved. But effective legal reform in 
Mexico, as in many other countries, runs into tremendous political obstacles. Perhaps the 
most important objections come from the controlling shareholders at the top of large 
corporations.  Under the status quo, the existing firms can finance their own investment 
projects through internal cash flows as well as relationships with either captive or closely 
tied banks.  But the opposition to reform may also be supplemented by opposition from 
labor interests. After all, these interests are also receiving some rents from the existing 
arrangements.   
 
Further Legal Reform 
 
As the evidence in this paper shows, the law and its enforcement are a good predictor of 
the development of capital markets. Although the market-based mechanisms outlined 
above may help foster the growth of external funding, they have limitations.  Firms might 
adopt improved protections with non-standard contracts, but when violations occur, 
enforcement of the contracts may be harder in weak legal systems. For these reasons, 
further countrywide reforms are necessary.  The strategy for reform is not to create an 
ideal set of rules and then see how they can be enforced, but rather to enact the rules that 
can be enforced within the existing enforcement structure.   32 
  Mexico’s recent success in passing a new Securities Law that substantially 
increases the level of disclosure and improves corporate governance requirements for 
listed firms should be complemented with a revamping of the current “Ley de Sociedades 
Anónimas” of the Commercial Code. In some instances, this might require refining 
existing principles to make them more applicable.  In other cases, it is necessary to create 
rights that are easily enforceable.  The reform of Mexican corporation law may not need 
to follow the U.S.-type mechanisms that rely heavily on the judicial system by means of 
derivative or class-action suits. Instead, once one recognizes the state of the legal system, 
the application of more “automatic” principles may be a better answer for Mexico.   
  Judicial reform is another key ingredient in this agenda. Without a serious 
restructuring of the rules of civil procedure, among other things, the tax of an inefficient 
judicial system for all companies is a large drawback when they face international 
competition for resources.  Judicial reform along the lines suggested in López-de-Silanes 
(2002) should be pushed forward.  
  Finally, a government measure that may be more politically feasible in Congress 
is the improvement of corporate governance practices for those firms that still have 
participation of the state. Despite widespread privatization in Mexico, there are still close 
to 150 state-controlled enterprises, and these firms could set an example for private firms 
by adopting better investor protections.  Most of the state-run firms in Mexico are large 
public utilities or in natural resources. External funding is just as important for them, if 
not more important, than for private firms, because of substantially reduced government 
expenditures. They need higher levels of investment to meet the demand from the 
growing private sector. Therefore, it becomes imperative for them to find mechanisms to 
fund their projects from capital markets. Reform of corporate charters and improved 
investor protection would also alleviate the government budget constraint.  The adoption 
of the code of best practices outlined above can provide a quick and easy way for these 





Slow and difficult as it is, real legal reform needs to take place in Mexico. But for this 
reason, it is necessary to complement it with the use of market-based mechanisms that   33 
push firms to unilaterally improve their firm-level governance practices.  The evidence 
about the benefits of firm-level measures corroborates the importance to push for the 
creation of such mechanisms.  
  Market-based mechanisms should be designed to temporarily substitute or 
complement the reform of laws and regulations. These measures should be, as the current 
Corporate Governance Code is, a set of public measures that facilitate competition and 
ratings, making it possible for the firms that adhere to such measures to access capital at 
lower cost. At the same time, these mechanisms also have the objective of 
extending/publicizing the concept of better corporate governance practices.  This code is 
a substantial step forward in the creation of a culture of investor protection, as it allows 
investors: (1) to distinguish firms that do have effective corporate governance 
mechanisms in place and (2) to reward firms that offer better protection with higher 
valuation multiples or lower costs of capital.  
  Enhanced disclosure requirements may not be sufficient to push firms to engage 
in unilateral changes.  An additional desirable complementary measure could be to 
restrict institutional investors to investment in companies that meet minimum corporate-
governance standards. These standards may be determined in relation to the code of best 
practices or by independent best-practice commissions.   This recommendation is based 
on purely prudential reasons as well as on the need to create an incentive for firms to 
agree on better investor protection. A similar idea has been implemented in Chile, also a 
civil law country, where a commission detailed a large list of minimum requirements that 
issuers of securities must meet in order to be the object of investment by institutional 
investors (Decree. No. 3.500 in Chile). 
  The adoption of such measures should constitute a useful first step in Mexico as 
they will facilitate the unilateral movement for better firm-level changes in governance 
and create precedent for future legal reform. 
   
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
In this paper we have provided an analysis of the recent evolution of capital markets, 
laws governing investor protection, the quality of enforcement of these laws, and their 
effect on the availability of external financing in Mexico in the last two decades.     34 
  The evidence gathered in this paper shows that the legal environment faced by 
corporation in Mexico poses serious problems for their access to capital.  But the set of 
new results at the firm-level show that those firms that have started to use the available 
differentiating tools to improve their corporate governance are rewarded by the market 
with lower costs of capital as they provide better returns to their investors.   
  Finally, based on Mexico’s evolution and a cross-country comparison, the last 
section of the paper has outlined the possibilities for legal reform and the use of further 
market-based incentives for individual firms to successfully increase investor protection 
and thus deepen Mexican financial markets. 
  Overall, the country and firm-level evidence for Mexico is supportive of the 
growing literature arguing that it is only through the development of efficient institutions 
and investor security that firms can secure the basis for sustainable long-run access to 
finance.   35 
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Section 2. Investor Protection Evolution in the Last 25 Years (Tables) 
 
Table 2.1.  Shareholders’ Rights in 1995 
This table classifies countries by legal origin. Definitions for each of the variables can be 
found in Appendix A.1.  Panel A includes data for 42 countries, and Panel B includes 
data for 72 countries. 















   Shareholder rights  (1=investor protection is in the law) 
  Panel A: Shareholders rights in 1995 
Common Legal 
Origin 
            
Malaysia 0  1  0  0.1  1  1  4 
New Zealand  1  1  0  0.05  0  1  4 
UK 1  1  0  0.1  1  1  5 
US 1  1  1  0.1  0  1  5 
Mean Common Law  0.39  1  0.28  0.09  0.44  0.94  3.06 
 Civil Law Legal 
Origin 
                    
Chile 0  1  1  0.1  1  1  5 
Mexico 0  0  0  0.33  1  0  1 
Spain 0  0  1  0.05  1  1  4 
South Korea  0  0  0  0.05  0  1  2 
Mean Civil Law   0.18  0.71  0.27  0.11  0.53  0.53  2.65 
              
World average  0.18  0.71  0.27  0.11  0.53  0.53  2.65 
             
  Panel B: Shareholders rights in 2005 
 














Origin             
Malaysia  1 1  0  10%  1  1.0  5.0 
New Zealand  0 1  0  5%  1  1.0  4.0 
United Kingdom  1 1  0  10%  1  1.0  5.0 
United States  1 1  0  .  0  1.0  3.0 
Mean Common Law   0.81 1.00  0.10  9%  0.52  0.90  4.24   40 
Table 2.1, continued 
 
 Civil Law Legal 
Origin             
Chile  0  1  1  10%  1  0.0  4.0 
Mexico  0  1  0  10%  1  0.0  3.0 
Morocco  0  0  0  10%  1  0.0  2.0 
Korea   1  0  1  3%  1  0.5  4.5 
Mean Civil Law  0.14 0.55  0.35  10%  0.90  0.31  3.04 
             
World average  0.33 0.68  0.28  10%  0.79  0.49  3.39 
Sources: Panel A: La Porta et al. (1998); Panel B: Djankov et al. (2005). 
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Table 2.2. Example of Management Proposals to be Voted on 
at Annual General Meetings in Mexico 
 
PROPOSAL No. 1: Amend statutes 
Status: Non-routine 
Sponsor: Management 
Opposition: None known 
Proxy materials contained no information on this agenda item. Most likely it is intended to restate 
the Company’s capital stock in its statutes. 
PROPOSAL No. 2: Approve financial statements 
Status: Routine 
Sponsor: Management 
Opposition: None known 
PROPOSAL No. 3: Set dividend 
Status: Routine 
Sponsor: Management 
Opposition: None known 
Management is asking of shareholders to approve a dividend of 0.08 pesos per share. It is not 
clear from materials furnished by the company whether this is full dividend or just the fourth-
quarter payment. 
PROPOSAL No. 4: Authorize share repurchase 
Status: Routine 
Sponsor: Management 
Opposition: None known 
Management is asking for shareholders’ authorization to repurchase its shares. It gives no reason, 
time limit, or maximum or minimum amount for this proposal. 




Opposition: None known 
The proposal wants shareholders to approve any board candidates who might be standing for 
election or reelection. As is common in Mexico, the Company does not include information 
identifying the nominees in its proxy statement. If directors are to be elected, their names will be 
announced at the annual meeting. 
Shareholders are asked to approve the fees for the directors, their alternates, and the stockholders 
examiners. The amounts are not disclosed in the proxy materials. 
PROPOSAL No. 6: Appoint auditors and set their fees 
Status: Routine 
Sponsor: Management 
Opposition: None known 
Shareholders are being asked to approve the appointment of “independent” auditors and their 
fees. Managementhas not published the name of the authors, but will announce both that and the 
proposed fees at the annual meeting itself.   42 
Table 2.3. Securities Laws in 2001 
This table classifies countries by legal origin. Definitions for each of the variables can be 
found in Appendix A.1. Data are available for 49 countries. 






Common Legal Origin          
Malaysia  0.92  0.66  0.77 
New Zealand  0.67  0.44  0.33 
United States  1.00  1.00  0.90 
United Kingdom  0.83  0.66  0.68 
Mean common law  0.78  0.58  0.62 
           
Civil Law Legal Origin          
Chile  0.58  0.33  0.60 
Mexico  0.58  0.11  0.35 
Spain  0.50  0.66  0.33 
Korea  0.75  0.66  0.25 
Mean civil law   0.54  0.32  0.39 
           
World average  0.60  0.41  0.52 
                   Source: La Porta et al. (2004).   43 
Table 2.4. Anti-Self-Dealing Regulations in 2005 
This table classifies countries by legal origin. Definitions for each of the variables can be 
found in Appendix A.1. Data are available for 72 countries. 
Country  Ex-ante private control of 
self-dealing 






Common Legal Origin             
Malaysia  1.00  0.90  0.95  1.00 
New Zealand  1.00  0.90  0.95  0.00 
United States  0.33  0.97  0.65  0.00 
United Kingdom  1.00  0.85  0.93  0.00 
Mean common law  0.58  0.76  0.67  0.27 
Civil Law Legal Origin             
Chile  0.50  0.75  0.63  1.00 
Mexico  0.19  0.16  0.18  0.50 
Spain  0.22  0.52  0.37  0.75 
Korea   0.25  0.67  0.46  0.50 
Mean civil law   0.31  0.44  0.37  0.42 
              
World average  0.39  0.53  0.46  0.38 
Source: Djankov et al. (2005).   44 
Table 2.5.  Enforcement of Laws 
This table classifies countries by legal origin. Definitions for each of the variables can be 
found in Appendix A.1. Data are available for 49 countries for all variables, except 
“Court formalism to collect bounced checks,”which is available for 109 countries. 
Country 
Efficiency of 
judicial system  Rule of law Corruption
Accounting 
standards 
Court Formalism to 
collect bounced check 
Common Legal Origin        
Malaysia 9.00  6.78  7.38  76  2.34 
New Zealand  10.00  10.00  10.00  70  1.58 
United Kingdom  10.00  8.57  9.10  78  2.58 
United States  10.00  10.00  8.63  71  2.62 
Mean Common law  8.15  6.46  7.06  69.62  2.76 
Civil Law Legal Origin             
Chile 7.25  7.02  5.30  52  4.57 
Mexico 6.00  5.35  4.77  60  4.71 
Spain 6.25  7.8  7.38  64  5.25 
South Korea  6.00  5.35  5.3  62  3.37 
Mean Civil law   7.38  7.07  6.80  56.89  4.48 
                 
World average  7.67  6.85  6.90  60.93  3.53 
Source: La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) and Djankov et al. (2003).   45 
Table 2.6. Market Outcomes 
This table classifies countries by legal origin. Definitions for each of the variables can be 
found in Appendix A.1. Data are available for 72 countries. 
Country  Stock market 
capitalization to GDP
Listed firms per 




Common Legal Origin                
Malaysia  148.4  34.6  6.18  5%  54% 
New Zealand  40.1  36.9  0.06  4%  48% 
United Kingdom  157.7  33.1  11.27  0%  19% 
United States  142.1  22.8  5.47  2%  20% 
Mean Common law  85.5  32.6  3.7  4%  44% 
Civil Law Legal Origin                
Chile  89.7  16.7  0.51  15%  45% 
Mexico  21.9  1.7  0.22  47%  64% 
Spain  79.9  45.9  2.41  2%  51% 
Korea  54.1  29.4  5.32  17%  23% 
Mean Civil law   48.6  25.7  2.54  14%  49% 
          
World average  59.4  27.7  2.97  11%  47% 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) and Dyck and Zingales (2004).   46 
Section 3. Capital Markets in Mexico (Figures) 
 




























             Source: World Bank (2005). 
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           Source: World Bank (2005).    48 








         Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Standard & Poor’s (2005) and World Bank (2005).  
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     Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from Standard & Poor’s (2005) and World Bank (2005).  
   50 
























Number of public offerings in Mexico  New Mexican firms issuing equity through ADR’s
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Martínez and Werner (2002) and Bank of New York 
(2005). The series from Martinez and Werner is only available until year 2002. 
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English German  Scandinavian French Mexican
Firms listed in US markets/Firms listed in domestic markets
Firms with ADR's in the US/Firms listed in domestic markets
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Bank of New York (2005) and Standard & Poor’s (2005). 
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Figure 3.7. 































Source: Standard & Poor’s (2005). 
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      Source: Standard & Poor’s (2005).   54 
Section 4.  Corporate Governance, Valuation and Investor Returns in Mexico 
(Tables and Figures) 
 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the empirical section of the paper. All variables were taken 
from each firm’s annual financial report, the Corporate Governance Code of Best practices and from each firm’s general 
statement. All reports are available on the Mexican Stock Exchange web site. 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Tobin's Q  108  0.943  0.86  0.361 0.372 2.280 
Price to book ratio  102  0.901  0.75  0.604 0.036 2.518 
ROA 139  2.312  2.27  5.701 -12.762 17.814 
ROE 135  6.353  6.98  11.703 -25.895 34.515 
Dividend payout   120  14.375  0.00  23.649 0.000 106.067 
Log (net sales)  145  5.373  5.62  2.413 -6.623 9.328 
Financial leverage  140  2.853  2.18  2.497 1.005 15.742 
Debt to assets  143  52.393  53.92  20.571 0.498 95.592 
Sales growth  137  2.710  2.93  23.077 -99.733 71.429 
Income to sales  141  4.799  4.12  20.783 -105.772 74.979 
Lagged income to sales  98  5.10  0.06  9.6 -31.1 36.4 
Size (top 10%)  150  0.09  0.00  0.292 0.000 1.000 
Located in Mexico city  150  0.591  1.00  0.493 0.000 1.000 
Equity listing  150  0.840  1.00  0.368 0.000 1.000 
CG index  150  0.783  0.81  0.132 0.273 0.982 
Board composition  150 0.667  0.67  0.194 0.111 1.000 
Board structure  150 0.693  0.80  0.258 0.000 1.000 
Board functions  150 0.890  0.92  0.150 0.167 1.000 
Director’s duties  150 0.903  0.89  0.099 0.714 1.000 
Evaluation and compensation committee  150 0.530  0.50  0.364 0.000 1.000 
Audit committee  150 0.842  0.89  0.162 0.143 1.000 
Finance and planning committee  150 0.712  1.00  0.422 0.000 1.000 
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Table 4.2. Mexico’s Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices 
This table shows the percentage of listed firms that answered YES to the each of the questions of the Corporate Governance 
Code of Best Practices developed by Mexico’s  Comisión Nacional de Valores.  The table includes the data of the 150 firms 
in our sample. 
Question 
Total 




1  The board of directors has between 5 and 15 members.  90.8% 91.1% 
2  Board members do not have substitutes  24.8% 26.0% 
3  Only pre-established substitute directors can take the place of the actual board member  86.5% 64.4% 
4  Actual board member suggests the substitute   67.4% 42.5% 
5  Independent directors and owner directors jointly represent at least 40 percent of the board  89.4% 87.0% 
6  Independent directors represent at least 20 percent of the total members of the board.  90.1% 89.0% 
7  The classification of directors as independent, owner, and related is included in the annual report.  58.9% 63.0% 
8  The annual report indicates the category to which each owner director belongs.  52.5% 54.1% 
9  The annual report indicates the positions and functions of each board member  66.0% 65.8% 
Mean   69.58% 64.76% 
Board Functions and Committees’ Structure   
 
10  The board performs the functions of evaluation and remuneration; auditing; and finance and 
planning through one or various intermediate governance bodies.  79.4% 82.2% 
11  Substitute directors are not part of board committees  60.3% 61.6% 
12  Board committees have between 3 and 7 members.  80.1% 82.9% 
13  In addition to his/her board duties, each independent director participates in at least one 
committee.  46.8% 45.2% 
14 An  independent  director  chairs the Audit committee.  79.4% 81.5% 
Mean   69.22% 70.68% 
Board Operation   
 
15  The board meets at least 4 times a year.  95.7% 96.6% 
16  The board defines long-term strategies at least once a year.  93.6% 93.2% 
17  At least 25 percent of the directors can call for a board meeting.  90.1% 89.7% 
18  Directors have access to all the relevant information for the decisions to be taken according to the 
agenda for the meeting, at least 5 business days prior to the meeting.  84.4%  83.6% 
19  A mechanism is established to enable directors to adequately assess the proposal related to 
confidential strategic matters.  77.3%  79.5% 
20  First-time directors are given adequate information of their responsibilities and duties, as well as 
data related to the corporation and its business environment.  92.9%  90.4% 
Mean   89.01% 88.81% 
Board members’ duties   
 
21  Disclose to the Chairman and secretary of the board any situation that may result in a conflict of 
interest and refrain from participating in such matters. 
97.2% 97.9% 
22  Use of the assets and/or services of the corporation only for matters related to it, and clearly 
define the policies that would apply for the use of such assets for personal matters.  97.2%  98.6% 
23  There are specific policies that regulate private use of the assets of the firm.  65.2% 63.0% 
24  Dedication of the necessary time and attention to the performance of their duties, assisting at least 
to 70 percent of the meetings (not applicable to the alternate directors).  97.2% 95.2%   56 
25  Maintain absolute confidentiality of all information, which may affect the operation of the 
corporation as well as of the deliberations that take place at the board meetings. 100.0%  100.0% 
26  Directors and their alternate directors, if any, must keep mutually informed in relation to the 
matters discussed in the board meetings they attend.  81.6%  74.7% 
27  Participate in the board of directors with opinions, recommendations and suggestions that derive 
from the analysis of the corporation’s operations. 97.2%  99.3% 
Mean   90.78% 89.82% 
Compensation and evaluation committee   
 
28  The board should be supported by reviewing the terms and conditions on which the CEO and the 
high ranking officers are being hired, as well as the possible payments in case of separation from 
the corporation; such terms and conditions should follow the general guidelines approved by the 
board.   63.1% 63.4% 
29  The annual report presented by the board of directors, discloses the policies adopted and the terms 
and conditions of the remuneration package of the directors, the CEO and the corporation’s high-
ranking officers.  43.3% 43.2% 
Mean   53.19% 53.30% 
Audit committee   
 
30  For the financial statements external audit and any other external review, board should not hire 
any accountant firm whose income for fees for all the services rendered to the corporation 
represent more than 20 percent of its total income.  92.2%  92.5% 
31  In order to ensure objectivity in the audit report, a rotation mechanism of the partner in charge of 
the preparation of the audit report should be recommended to the board. It is suggested that this 
rotation be made at least every six years.  88.7%  96.6% 
32  The person who signs the audit report of the annual financial statements of the corporation should 
not be the same person who acts as the Statutory Auditor. Nevertheless, both persons may be 
partners of the same firm.  86.5%  90.4% 
33  The committee should ensure that the professional profile of the Statutory Auditor enables 
him/her to adequately perform its duties. Furthermore, it is also recommended that the annual 
report presented by the board of directors disclose relevant information regarding the professional 
profile of the Statutory Auditor.  51.8% 50.7% 
34  The company should have an internal audit department.  87.2% 90.4% 
35  The committee should submit to the approval of the board of directors the accounting policies 
used in the preparation of the financial information.  73.0%  77.4% 
36  The board is assured that the midterm financial information is prepared with the same criteria, 
policies and practices as the annual financial information is. In the process, the board may obtain 
support from the internal auditor, the external auditor and the Statutory Auditor of the 
corporation.  82.3% 83.6% 
37  There is an internal control system.  97.9% 97.9% 
38  The committee should submit for board approval the general guidelines of the internal control 
system.  77.3% 78.8% 
39  The committee should assist the board by evaluating the effectiveness of the internal control 
system and by giving an opinion on the financial and operational controls.  77.3% 78.1% 
40  The external auditors should validate the effectiveness of the internal control system and present a 
report on such controls.  85.8% 84.2% 
41  The committee should ensure the existence of mechanisms that allow the board to determine if 
the corporation duly complies with all applicable laws and regulations.   83.0% 84.9% 
42  The board revises the applicable laws and regulations at least once a year and  holds a review on 
the matter at least once a year.  94.3% 95.9% 
43  The board is informed about the legal situation  92.9% 92.5% 
Mean   83.59% 85.27% 
Finance and planning committee   
 
44  The committee should submit to the board of directors an evaluation of the feasibility of the main 
investments and financing transactions of the corporation, same that should be in line with the 
existing policies.  69.5% 74.0% 
45  The committee should periodically evaluate the strategic position of the corporation in terms of 
the strategic plan.  68.8% 72.6% 
46  The committee should assist the board in reviewing the consistency of the investment and  68.8% 71.2%   57 
financing policies with the strategic plan of the corporation. 
47  The committee should assist the board in reviewing the financial projections of the corporation 
while assuring their consistency with the strategic plan.  68.8%  71.2% 
Mean   68.97% 72.26% 
Shareholders meeting   
 
48  It is suggested not to include in the agenda an item referred to as "General Matters".   92.9% 93.2% 
49  It is suggested to avoid the grouping of matters related to different topics within a single item. 
The latter has the purpose to allow stockholders to vote each item separately, in addition to 
provide them with information on all topics to be discussed at the meeting.  98.6%  98.6% 
50  The company should make available 15 days prior to the day of the meeting, all information on 
each item of the shareholders meeting agenda.  96.5% 95.9% 
51  The shareholders with enough information and voting alternatives has the power to twist the 
voting according to their interests  66.7% 64.4% 
52  The company should include the proposals of members to be appointed for the board of directors 
and a brief professional profile of each candidate, as part of the information delivered to the 
shareholders.  50.4% 52.7% 
53  The information disclosed includes the relevant issues of the work of the intermediate governance 
bodies.  51.8% 58.9% 
54  The board of directors should include in its annual report to the shareholders meeting the relevant 
aspects involved in the tasks performed by each intermediate governance body and make 
available to the shareholders the reports of each governance body submitted to the board together 
with all other material for the Meeting, with the exception of information which confidentiality 
may affect the competitiveness of the corporation. In addition, it is recommended to include in the 
annual report the names of the members of each intermediate governance body.  66.0%  71.2% 
55  In order to keep communication channels open with shareholders and potential investors, each 
corporation should have in place policies, mechanisms and designate responsible parties to inform 
these investors.  95.7% 96.6% 
Mean   77.30% 78.94% 
All firms with publicly traded securities  78.4% 78.5% 
     
Firms with publicly traded bonds  65.41% 65.62% 
     
Firms with publicly traded stocks  80.32% 80.78% 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (2004). 
Note: The horizontal axis represents the percentage of the code recommendations met by firms.  The 
vertical axis measures the density function, which shows the proportion of firms that meet each percentage 
range of principles of the code.   59 























Firms with publicly traded stocks Firms with publicly traded bonds 
 
        Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (2004). 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (2004). 
Note: The table shows the  average level of compliance with all of the Code of Best Practices 
recommendations by  all firms with publicly traded equity and bonds listed in the Mexican 
Stock Exchange. The number of firms each year changes according to new listings and delisting. 
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Table 4.3. Correlation Matrix of the Main Variables 




Tobin's Q  Price to 
book 
ratio 





















Tobin's Q  0.2309                                           
  0.0162                        
0.1834  0.8667                        Price to book 
ratio  0.0651  0.0000                       
ROA  0.0880  0.4139  0.4015                      
  0.3030  0.0000  0.0000                      
ROE  -0.0136  0.4533  0.3652  0.8602                     
  0.8760  0.0000  0.0003  0.0000                     
0.1024  0.2708  0.2334  0.3387  0.2988                    Dividend payout 
0.2655  0.0079  0.0286  0.0002  0.0015                   
0.2947  0.3753  0.2969  0.2092  0.1719  0.3015                  Log (net sales) 
0.0003  0.0001  0.0026  0.0134  0.0463  0.0008                 
-0.1972  0.0080  0.0273  -0.1035 0.2619  -0.0850  -0.0402                Financial 
leverage  0.0195  0.9354  0.7864  0.2307  0.0022  0.3666  0.6374               
-0.0992 0.0051 -0.1257 -0.1700 0.1815  -0.0923  0.1768  0.7276              Debt to assets 
0.2385 0.9582 0.2103 0.0455 0.0351  0.3202  0.0347  0.0000             
0.0417 0.2713 0.2682 0.2965 0.4357  0.0739  0.3808 0.1144  0.1658              Sales Growth 
0.6289 0.0053 0.0082 0.0006 0.0000  0.4347  0.0000 0.1916  0.0546             
-0.1585 0.1577 0.1653 0.5583 0.6184  0.0867  -0.0471 0.3443  0.1121  0.3295            Income to sales 
0.0605 0.1047 0.1002 0.0000 0.0000  0.3546  0.5790 0.0000  0.1856  0.0001           
-0.0688 0.2817 0.1574 0.5175 0.4710  0.2767  0.1860  -0.2186 -0.3323  0.0591 0.4397          Lagged income 
to sales  0.5011 0.0068 0.1478 0.0000 0.0000  0.0104  0.0682  0.0323  0.0009 0.5692 0.0000         
0.1467 0.2112 0.2390 -0.0259 0.0465  -0.0153  0.0653  0.0908  0.0688 0.0212 0.1300  0.0236        Located in 
Mexico city  0.0741 0.0282 0.0155 0.7623 0.5924  0.8681  0.4353  0.2858  0.4145 0.8057 0.1245  0.8175       
ADR issuer  0.2283 0.0084 0.1147 0.0984 0.0130  0.2015  0.3237  -0.1145  -0.0745 0.0339 -0.1758 0.0180  0.0678     
 0.0050  0.9310  0.2508  0.2490  0.8813  0.0273  0.0001  0.1781  0.3762 0.6943 0.0371  0.8603  0.4115     
0.0561 0.2095 0.1090 0.1082 0.1625  0.1044  0.3993  0.1323  0.1675 0.0643 0.1279  0.1565  0.0342  0.1100    Size (top 10%) 
0.4953 0.0295 0.2753 0.2047 0.0597  0.2567  0.0000  0.1190  0.0456 0.4553 0.1307  0.1238  0.6786  0.1802   
Equity listing  0.4499 .  . -0.0468 -0.2003 0.1427 0.1670  -0.3774  -0.3273 -0.1182 -0.2553 .  -0.0157  0.1905  0.0775 
   0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.5841  0.0198  0.1201  0.0447  0.0000  0.0001 0.1690 0.0022  1.0000 0.8491  0.0196  0.3458   63 
 
 
Table 4.4. Valuation Regressions 
 
Industry-level fixed effects regressions of the firms included in the sample. We regress 
our valuation measures against standard controls and include the Corporate Governance 
index as the interest variable. The dependent variable in Panel A is Tobin’s Q and in 
Panel B is Price to Book Ratio. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. All variables are described in Appendix A.2. 
  Panel A: Tobin’s Q 
CG index  1.010  1.025  0.991  0.792  0.855  0.973 
 (0.432)**  (0.370)*** (0.437)** (0.423)* (0.385)**  (0.465)**
Log (net sales)  0.042  0.033  0.061  0.032  0.029  0.066 
 (0.024)*  (0.025)  (0.036)*  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.041) 
Financial 
leverage 
0.014 0.003 0.021       
 (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.017)       
Debt to assets        -0.000  -0.000  -0.001 
       (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Sales growth  0.001      0.003     
 (0.002)      (0.003)     
Income to sales    0.005      0.004   
   (0.002)*      (0.003)   
Lagged income 
to sales 
   0.007      0.005 
     (0.587)      (0.607) 
Constant -0.172  -0.119  -0.343  0.120  0.074  -0.248 
 (0.374)  (0.309)  (0.453)  (0.330)  (0.286)  (0.420) 
Observations 102 105 90  104  107 91 
Number of 
industries 
31 31 30  31  31  31 
R-squared 0.17  0.20  0.21  0.15  0.15  0.21 
Log likelihood  -9.90  -6.03  -2.64  -11.86  -9.92  -2.54 
Rho 0.30  0.31  0.26  0.29  0.30  0.24 
  Panel B: Price to Book Ratio 
CG index  1.175  1.088  0.903  1.050  1.082  0.930 
 (0.663)*  (0.620)*  (0.711)  (0.655)  (0.632)*  (0.712) 
Log (net sales)  0.038  0.066  0.030  0.050  0.076  0.051 
 (0.034)  (0.039)*  (0.056)  (0.033)  (0.036)**  (0.051) 
Financial 
leverage 
0.040 0.012 0.035       
 (0.023)*  (0.024)  (0.034)       
Debt to assets        -0.001  -0.003  -0.004 
       (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Sales growth  0.004      0.003     
 (0.004)      (0.004)     
Income to sales    0.003      0.003   
   (0.004)      (0.004)   
Lagged income      0.001      0.007   64 
to sales 
     (0.939)      (0.789) 
Constant -0.394  -0.394  -0.156  -0.222  -0.277  0.026 
 (0.538)  (0.497)  (0.703)  (0.504)  (0.502)  (0.684) 
Observations 96 100  85  96  100  85 
Number of 
industries 
31 31 30  31  31 30 
R-squared 0.13  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.12  0.10 
Log likelihood  -50.92  -60.56  -43.08  -51.69  -60.21  -42.90 
Rho 0.42  0.37  0.52  0.40  0.35  0.50 
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Table 4.5. Performance Regressions 
 
Industry-level fixed effects regressions of the firms included in the sample. We regress our 
performance measures against standard controls and include the Corporate Governance index as 
the interest variable. The dependent variable in Panel A is ROA and in Panel B is ROE..  * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. All variables are described in Appendix A.2. 
  Panel A: ROA 
CG index  7.368  12.898  7.615  12.099 
 (4.434)*  (5.826)**  (4.501)*  (5.840)** 
Log (net sales)  0.555  0.490  0.742  0.522 
 (0.301)*  (0.480)  (0.341)**  (0.507) 
Financial leverage  -0.488  -0.045     
 (0.213)**  (0.354)     
Debt to assets      -0.085  -0.028 
     (0.034)**  (0.059) 
Sales growth  0.089    0.063   
 (0.021)***    (0.031)**   
Lagged income to sales    0.231    0.219 
   (9.237)**    (9.654)** 
Constant -5.328  -12.100  -3.457  -10.316 
 (3.893)  (6.475)*  (4.369)  (6.253) 
Observations 128  94  131  95 
Number of industries  31  31  32  31 
R-squared 0.23  0.31  0.23  0.31 
Log likelihood  -358.23  -253.62  -372.61  -256.35 
Rho 0.44  0.49  0.39  0.47 
  Panel B: ROE 
CG index  13.005  20.076  12.491  19.174 
 (9.353)  (11.282)*  (9.160)  (11.494) 
Log (net sales)  1.334  1.168  1.383  1.006 
 (0.621)**  (0.962)  (0.629)**  (1.070) 
Financial leverage  0.311  0.151     
 (0.510)  (1.172)     
Debt to assets      0.012  0.052 
     (0.060)  (0.119) 
Sales growth  0.217    0.219   
 (0.055)***    (0.056)***   
Lagged income to sales    0.411    0.439 
   (18.749)**    (21.251)** 
Constant -13.055  -20.342  -12.602  -20.978 
 (8.414)  (12.417)  (8.629)  (11.810)* 
Observations 126  92  127  92 
Number of industries  30  30  31  30 
R-squared 0.25  0.27  0.25  0.27 
Log likelihood  -441.44  -312.16  -444.78  -311.89 
Rho 0.39  0.48  0.39  0.48 
   66 
 
Figure 4.2. Partial Regression Plot of CG Index and Tobin’s Q 
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coef = 1.0098837, (robust) se = .43205254, t = 2.34
Partial regression plot for CG index and Tobin's Q
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Figure 4.3. Partial Regression Plot of CG Index and Price to Book Ratio. 
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Partial regression plot for CG index and PTBR
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Figure 4.4. Partial Regression Plot of CG Index and ROA 
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Partial regression plot for CG index and ROA
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Figure 4.5. Partial Regression Plot of CG Index and ROE 
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Table 4.6. Dividend Regressions 
Tobit regressions including industry level dummies of the firms included in the sample. We 
regress our dividend measures against standard controls and include the Corporate Governance 
index as the interest variable. The dependent variable is the dividend payout.  * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. All variables are described in Appendix A.2. 
  Dividend payout   
CG  index  93.726 23.243 65.213  74.107 22.644 57.726 
 (42.878)**  (38.593)  (49.781)  (40.993)* (37.873)  (51.364) 
Log (net 
sales) 
10.488 8.238  7.306  10.272 8.865  7.308 
 (2.987)***  (2.857)*** (3.570)**  (2.882)*** (2.827)***  (3.856)* 
Financial 
leverage 
4.418  -0.875  13.457     
  (2.785)  (2.301)  (4.590)***     
Debt to 
assets 
    -0.029  -0.227  0.683 
      (0.251)  (0.248)  (0.354)* 
Sales  growth  0.401     0.335    
  (0.288)     (0.282)    
Income to 
sales 
 0.436    0.426  




   0.272     0.255 
     (80.760)***    (87.564)***
Constant  -157.051 -70.945 -148.821 -125.754 -63.837 -147.088 
 (49.259)***  (41.501)*  (59.755)** (47.175)*** (41.207)  (62.708)** 
Observations  109 113  84  112 116  85 
Pseudo  R-sq  0.12 0.10 0.15  0.11 0.11 0.14 
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Table 4.7.  Instrumental Variable Regressions 
Instrumental variable regressions including industry level dummies of the firms included in the sample. We regress our dependent variables against 
standard controls and include the instrumented Corporate Governance index. Panel A presents regressions for the valuation measures (Tobin’s Q 
and PTBR), here we use a size dummy (=1 for firms on the top 10% of the total asset distribution) and Mexico City (=1 for firms legally located on 
Mexico City). Panel B presents regressions for the performance measures; here we instrument the CGI using the size dummy and an equity-listing 
dummy (this variable is not available for the valuation measures because firms with bonds does not have any market valuation measure available). 
Finally, panel C presents the results for the dividend payout tobit instrumental variables regressions, where we use the same instruments as in Panel 
B. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All variables are described in 
Appendix A.2. 
Panel A: Valuation regressions 
 Tobin’s  Q  PTBR 
CG Index  3.429  3.100  3.316  5.596  7.545  8.747 
  (2.024)*  (1.851)*  (2.147) (3.315)* (4.749)  (6.760) 
Log(Net sales)  0.039  0.017 0.076  0.020  -0.012  0.009 
 (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.038)*  (0.052)  (0.081)  (0.096) 
Financial leverage  0.039 0.009 0.035  0.087  0.041 0.098 
 (0.039)  (0.026)  (0.040)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.108) 
Sales growth  -0.001      -0.002     
 (0.003)      (0.006)     
Income to sales    0.006      0.004   
   (0.003)*      (0.007)   
Lagged income to sales      0.004      0.004 
     (0.585)      (1.546) 
Constant -2.189  -1.727  -2.349 -3.995 -5.243  -6.520 
 (1.679)  (1.428)  (1.838)  (2.749)  (3.654)  (5.592) 
Observations 95  98  83  88  92  78 
Number of industries  31  31  30  31  31  30 
R-sq overall  0.09  0.12 0.18  0.04  0.03 0.03 
F test  2.11  2.33  2.15 1.21 0.92  0.53 
Panel B: Performance regressions 
 ROA  ROE 
CG index  19.370  16.848  45.336  163.476 
 (9.655)**  (162.571)  (20.438)**  (912.525) 
Log (net sales)  0.272  0.501  0.811  1.816 
 (0.327)  (0.574)  (0.644)  (4.377) 
Financial leverage  -0.399 -0.018  0.321  1.126 
 (0.230)*  (1.176)  (0.460)  (6.383) 
Sales growth  0.087    0.215   
 (0.028)***    (0.057)***   
Income to sales         
        
Lagged income to sales    0.228    0.285 
   (12.559)*    (83.352) 
Constant -13.579  -15.437  -35.689  -142.795 
 (7.257)*  (137.360)  (15.496)**  (779.293) 
Observations 122  94  123  92 
Number of industries  31  31  30  30 
R-sq overall  0.11  0.26  0.08  0.05 
F test  5.76  5.55  6.97  1.34 
Panel C: Dividend regressions 
 Dividend  payout 
CG index  201.662  289.307 
 (136.052)  (219.096) 
Log (net sales)  9.514  7.288 
 (2.820)***  (4.001)* 
Financial leverage  3.705  0.783 
 (3.218)  (0.008) 
Sales growth  0.316   
 (0.316)   
Income to sales    0.466 
   (0.506) 
Constant -239.088 -290.529 
 (116.731)**  (0.084)*** 
Observations 109  113 
Wald chi2  28.36  22.61   72 
Table 4.8. Correlation Matrix of the Dependent Variables, the CG Index and its Components 
This table presents the pair wise correlation matrix of the dependent variables used in the regressions, the Corporate Governance Index and its components. P-values are shown below the correlation 
coefficients. 
  




















Tobin's Q Price to 
book ratio
ROA ROE 
0.696                        
Administrative board 
0.000                        
0.696 0.496                          Board composition 
0.000 0.000                         
0.757 0.589  0.534                        Board structure 
0.000 0.000  0.000                       
0.605 0.906  0.395  0.420                      Board operation 
0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000                     
0.304 0.188  0.099  0.138  0.197                   Directors’ and Board 
members’ duties 
0.000 0.021  0.228  0.091  0.016                  
0.646 0.335  0.296  0.479  0.297  0.258                  Compensation and 
evaluation committee 
0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001                 
Audit committee  0.825 0.518  0.490  0.539  0.451  0.161 0.396               
  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.049 0.000               
0.601 0.306  0.176  0.313  0.230  0.098 0.567 0.399              Finance and planning 
committee  
0.000 0.000  0.032  0.000  0.005  0.235 0.000 0.000             
0.697 0.397  0.413  0.506  0.363  0.197 0.381 0.499  0.269            Shareholders meetings 
0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.016 0.000 0.000  0.001           
Tobin's Q  0.231  0.057  0.131  0.033  0.071  0.229 0.081 0.177  0.191 0.145         
 0.016  0.560  0.176  0.733  0.465  0.017  0.403 0.067  0.048  0.133         
Price to book ratio  0.183  0.118  0.050  0.018  0.071 0.145  0.138  0.156  0.165  0.136 0.867       
 0.065  0.236  0.620  0.856  0.477  0.146  0.168 0.117  0.098  0.173  0.000       
ROA  0.088 0.099  0.026  0.129  0.108  0.034 0.109 0.053  0.065  -0.004  0.414  0.402     
  0.303 0.248  0.761  0.130  0.207  0.694 0.202 0.535  0.444  0.960  0.000  0.000     
ROE -0.014  0.032  -0.117  -0.042  0.079  0.037  0.101 -0.037  0.084  -0.051  0.453  0.365  0.860   
  0.876 0.717  0.176  0.628  0.360  0.667 0.246 0.668  0.331  0.560  0.000  0.000  0.000   
0.102 0.007  0.158  0.105  0.063  0.062 0.032 0.080 -0.040  0.059 0.271  0.233  0.339  0.299 
Dividend payout   0.266 0.940  0.085  0.254  0.497  0.503 0.730 0.388 0.665  0.523  0.008  0.029  0.000  0.002  
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Table 4.9. Regressions for Corporate Governance Sub-Indices 
This table shows the regression coefficients taken from industry fixed effects models controlling by log (net sales), 
financial leverage and sales growth. For the case of the dividend payout ratio, we ran a tobit model controlling for 
all the above and industrial sector dummies. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   Tobin's Q 
Price to book 
ratio ROA ROE 
Dividend 
payout  
CG index  1.010 1.175 7.368  13.005  93.726 
  (0.432)** (0.663)*  (4.434)*  (9.353) (42.878)**
Administrative board  0.605 1.619 8.698  17.580  53.442 
(Aggregate of all three bellow)  (0.575) (0.868)*  (4.160)**  (9.527)*  (43.745) 
Board composition  0.358 0.360 3.770 5.430  76.031 
  (0.246) (0.405) (3.172) (5.995)  (28.685)***
Board structure  -0.137 -0.385 4.747  8.535 23.797 
  (0.216) (0.340)  (2.197)**  (4.782)*  (20.794) 
Board operation  0.599 1.029 8.528  17.021  64.080 
  (0.382) (0.630)  (3.584)**  (8.230)**  (37.694)* 
0.780 0.875 4.863 6.662  91.951  Director’s and Board members’ duties 
(0.418)* (0.610)  (5.391) (10.458)  (51.153)* 
0.120 0.167 2.131 5.009  22.506  Compensation and Evaluation 
committee  (0.090) (0.156) (1.360)  (2.868)*  (12.677)* 
Audit committee  0.922 0.664 1.814 0.440  47.971 
  (0.458)** (0.737)  (4.455)  (9.027)  (38.369) 
Finance and planning committee  0.183 0.280 1.396 2.324 8.289 
  (0.086)** (0.125)**  (1.216)  (2.418)  (10.505) 
Shareholders meetings  0.414 0.714 2.555 7.930  33.978 
   (0.259) (0.467) (3.362) (6.415)  (29.647) 
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Appendix A.1.  Variable Definitions 
This table describes the variables collected for the 49 countries included in our study.  The first column gives the 
name of the variable. The second column describes the variable and gives the range of possible values. The third 
column provides the sources from which the variable was collected. 
 
Variable  Description  Sources 
Legal Origin  Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country.  
Equals 1 if the origin is English Common Law;  2 if the origin is the French Commercial 
Code; and 3 if the origin is the German Commercial Code. 
La Porta et al., (1998) collected 
from  “Foreign Law 
Encyclopedia of Commercial 
Laws of the World.” 
Proxy by mail allowed  Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows shareholders to mail their 
proxy vote to the firm, and zero otherwise. 
La Porta et. al., (1998) 
Vote by mail 
Equals one if the law explicitly mandates or sets as a default rule that: (a) 
proxy solicitations paid by the company include a proxy form allowing 
shareholders to vote on the items on the agenda; (b) a proxy form to vote on 
the items on the agenda accompanies notice to the meeting; or (c) shareholders 
vote by mail on the items on the agenda (i.e. postal ballot); and zero otherwise. 
Djankov et al. (2005) 
Shares not blocked   Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code does not allow firms to require that 
shareholders deposit their shares prior to a General Shareholders Meeting thus preventing 
them  from selling those shares for a number of days, and zero otherwise. 
La Porta et al. , (1998) 
Shares not deposited 
 
Equals 1 if the law does not require, nor explicitly permits companies to 
require, shareholders to deposit with the company or another firm any of their 
shares prior to a general shareholders meeting. 
Djankov et al. (2005) 
Cumulative voting  
or proportional 
representation 
Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows shareholders to cast all of their 
votes for one candidate standing for election to the board of directors (cumulative voting) or 
if the Company Law or Commercial Code allows a mechanism of proportional 
representation in the board by which minority interests may name a proportional number of 
directors to the board, and zero otherwise. 
La Porta et al. , (1998) 
Djankov et al. (2005) 
Capital to call a 
Meeting 
It is the minimum percentage of ownership of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call 
for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting.  It  ranges from one to 33 percent. 
La Porta et al. , (1998) 
Djankov et al. (2005) 
Preemptive rights  Equals one when the Company Law or Commercial Code grants shareholders the first 
opportunity to buy new issues of stock and this right can only be waved by a shareholders’ 
vote, and zero otherwise. 
La Porta et al. , (1998) 
Djankov et al. (2005) 
Oppressed minorities   Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code grants minority shareholders either a 
judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management or of the assembly or the right to 
step out of the company by requiring the company to purchase their shares when they object 
to certain fundamental changes, such as mergers, assets dispositions and changes in the 
articles of incorporation. The variable equals zero otherwise.  Minority shareholders are 
defined as those shareholders who own 10 percent of share capital or less. 
La Porta et al. , (1998) 
Djankov et al. (2005) 
Anti directors rights 
index 
An index aggregating the shareholder rights which we labeled as “anti-director rights.” The 
index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy 
vote to the firm; (2)  shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General 
Shareholders’ Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in 
the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary 
Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or (6) 
shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waved by a shareholders’ vote.  The 
index ranges from 0 to 6. 
La Porta et al. , (1998) 
Djankov et al. (2005) 
Disclosure 
requirements index 
The index of disclosure equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Prospect; (2) Compensation; (3) 
Shareholders; (4) Inside ownership; (5) Contracts Irregular; (6) and Transactions. 
La Porta et al. (2006)  
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Variable  Description  Sources 
Liability standards 
index 
The index of liability standards equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Liability standard for the 
issuer and its directors; (2) Liability standard for distributors; and (3) Liability standard for 
accountants. 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
Public enforcement 
index 
The index of public enforcement equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Supervisor 
characteristics index; (2) Rulemaking power index; (3) Investigative powers index; (4) 
Orders index; and (5) Criminal index. 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
Ex-ante private 
control of self dealing 
Index of ex-ante control of self-dealing transactions. Average of approval by 
disinterested shareholders and ex-ante disclosure. 
Djankov et al. (2005) 
Ex-post private 
control of self dealing 
Index of ex-post control over self-dealing transactions. Average of disclosure 
in periodic filings and ease of proving wrongdoing. Ranges from zero to one. 
Djankov et al. (2005) 
Anti self dealing index  Average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing.  Djankov et al. (2005) 
Public enforcement of 
self dealing 
Index of public enforcement. Ranges from 0 to 1. One quarter point when 
each of the following sanctions is available: (1) fines for the approving body; 
(2) jail sentences for the approving body; (3) fines for Mr. James; and (4) jail 
sentence for Mr. James. 
Djankov et al. (2005) 
Efficiency of judicial 
system 
Assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms” produced by the country-risk rating agency Business 
International Corporation.  It  “may be taken to represent investors’ assessments of 
conditions in the country in question”.  Average between 1980-1983.  Scale from 0 to 10, 
with lower scores lower efficiency levels. 
La Porta et al. , (1998) 
Rule of law  Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country-risk rating 
agency International Country Risk (ICR).  Average of the months of April and October of 
the monthly index between 1982 and 1995.  Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less 
tradition for law and order.(We changed the scale from its original range going from 0 to 6). 
La Porta et al. , (1998) 
Corruption  ICR’s assessment of the corruption in government.  Lower scores indicate “high government 
officials are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally 
expected throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes connected with 
import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans”.  
Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995.  
Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher levels of corruption.  (We changed the scale 
from its original range going from 0 to 6). 
La Porta et al. , (1998) 
Accounting standards  Index created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or 
omission of 90 items.  These items fall into 7 categories (general information, income 
statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock data and 
special items).  A minimum of 3 companies in each country were studied.  The companies 
represent a cross-section of various industry groups where industrial companies numbered 
70 percent while financial companies represented the remaining 30 percent. 
La Porta et al. , (1998) 
Court formalism to 
collect a bounced 
check 
The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at 
lower-level civil trial courts, and is formed by adding up the following indices: (i) 
professionals vs. laymen, (ii) written vs. oral elements, (iii) legal justification, (iv) statutory 
regulation of evidence, (v) control of superior review, (vi) engagement formalities, and (vii) 
independent procedural actions. The index ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level 
of control or intervention in the judicial process. 
Djankov et al. (2003) 
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP 
Ratio of the market capitalization (also known as market value, which is the share price 
times the number of shares outstanding) of listed domestic companies (the domestically 
incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year)  
divided by the GDP (in millions).  
La Porta et al. (1998) for Table 
2.6 and World Bank (2005) for 
Figure 3.1.  
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Variable  Description  Sources 
Listed firms per 
million pop. 
Ratio of the listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed 
on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year (this indicator does not include 
investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles) to its 
population (in millions). 
La Porta et al. (1998) for Table 
2.6 and World Bank (2005) for 
Figure 3.2. 
IPO’s to GDP  Average of the ratio of the equity issued by newly-listed firms in a given country (in 
thousands) to its gross domestic product (in millions) over the period 1996-2000. 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
Block premium  “The block premia is computed taking the difference between the price per share paid for 
the control block and the exchange price two days after the announcement of the control 
transaction, dividing by the exchange price and multiplying by the ratio of the proportion of 
cash flow rights represented in the controlling block.” We use the country’s sample media. 
La Porta et al. (2006), taken 




Average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten 
largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country. A firm is 
considered privately-owned if the State is not a known shareholder in it.  
La Porta et al. (1999), 
Hartland-Peel (1996) for 
Kenya, Bloomberg and various 
annual reports for Ecuador, 
Jordan, and Uruguay. 
Trading volume to 
GDP 
Total trading volume divided by the country’s GDP (expressed in 2001 US$) of a certain 
country in a given year. 
World Bank (2005) 
Trading volume to 
market capitalization 
Total trading volume divided by the country’s total market capitalization (expressed in 2001 
US$) of a certain country in a given year. 
Standard & Poor’s (2005) and 
World Bank (2005) 
Number of public 
offerings in Mexico 
Number of total public offerings registered in the Mexican stock exchange. Source: World 
Bank and MSE 
Martínez and Werner (2002) 
Mexican firms issuing 
equity abroad 
Total number of Mexican firms issuing equities in external financial markets.  Martínez and Werner (2002) 
New Mexican firms 
issuing equity through 
ADRs 
Number of Mexican firms incorporated each year to US stock markets through the issuance 
of ADRs. 
Bank of New York 
Firms listed in US 
markets/Firms listed 
in domestic markets 
Quotient of the number of firms listed in US markets and the number of firms listed in 
domestic markets. 
Bank of New York and 
Standard & Poor’s (2005) 
Firms with ADRs in 
the US/Firms listed in 
domestic markets 
Quotient of the number of firms with ADRs in the US and the number of firms listed in 
domestic markets. 
Bank of New York and 
Standard & Poor’s (2005) 
Price to book value of 
equity 
Quotient between the market value of equity and the book value of equity  Standard & Poor’s (2005) 
Dividend yield  Dividend yield, measured in percentage points.  Standard & Poor’s (2005) 
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Appendix A.2.  Variable Definitions 
This table describes the variables used in the empirical section of the paper. All variables were taken from each 
firm’s annual financial report, the Corporate Governance Code of Best practices and from each firm’s general 
statement. All reports are available on the Mexican Stock Exchange web site. 
Tobin’s Q  Defined as the market value of equity (actual shares outstanding times the closing price 
of the period)) plus total liabilities divided by total assets. 
Price to book ratio  Ratio between the market value of equity and the book value of equity.  
ROA  Ratio between net income and total assets. Expressed in percentage points 
ROE  Ratio between net income and the book value of equity (total assets minus total 
liabilities). Expressed in percentage points 
Dividend payout   Ratio between the dividends paid and net income. Expressed in percentage points. 
Log (net sales)  Natural logarithm of net sales, expressed in millions of US dollars. 
Financial leverage  Ratio between the total assets and the book value of equity. 
Debt to assets  Ratio between total debt and total assets. Expressed in percentage points. 
Sales growth  Percentage change in net sales. 
Income to sales  Ratio between net income and net sales. Expressed in percentage points. 
Lagged income to 
sales 
Mean of the ratio between net income and net sales for the period 1997-2001. Expressed 
in percentage points. 
Size (top 10%)  Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the company is on the top 10% of the 
total asset distribution and zero otherwise. 
Located in Mexico 
city 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the company is legally located in 
Mexico City and zero otherwise. 
Equity  Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the company has an equity trading in 
the stock market and zero when it has bonds 
CG index  Mean of the corporate governance index for the years 2003 and 2004. This variable is 
between zero and one and represents the accomplishment of the corporate governance 
principles stated in the questionnaire that all listed companies have to present to the 
Mexican Stock Exchange every year. 
 
 